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What best explains the democratic peace: empirical indicators of democracy or the 
mutual perceptions of democracy within a dyadic relationship? This paper will examine 
three enduring rivalry dyads: the United States-Great Britain, France-Germany, and 
India-Pakistan, during the course of their respective enduring rivalries (Bennett, 1997; 
Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Within each of these dyads, I will provide detailed case studies 
of two conflicts at different phases of democratization – six cases in total - in order to 
ascertain the answers to three questions: 1) What role, if any, did the democratic 
character of the individual governments play in the resolution of conflict between the 
dyadic members? 2) What role, if any, did perception of democratization, and the 
capability of securitization, play in the resolution of conflict between the dyadic 
members? 3) What role, if any, did other competing variables play in the resolution of 
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Chapter One  
Real or Imagined: Perceiving Democracy through Securitization 
 
Introduction 
What best explains the democratic peace: empirical indicators of levels of 
democracy or the mutual perception of democracy within a dyadic relationship? This 
paper will examine three enduring rivalry dyads: the United States-Great Britain, France-
Germany, and India-Pakistan, during the course of their respective enduring rivalries 
(Bennett, 1997; Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Within each of these dyads, I will provide 
detailed case studies of two conflicts at different phases of democratization – six cases in 
total - in order to ascertain the answers to three questions: 1) What role, if any, did the 
democratic character of the individual governments play in the resolution of conflict 
between the dyadic members? 2) What role, if any, did perception of democratization, 
and the capability of securitization, play in the resolution of conflict between the dyadic 
members? 3) What role, if any, did other competing variables play in the resolution of 
conflict between the dyadic members?  
 Immanuel Kant, writing at a time when autocracy was the rule and democracy 
most certainly the exception, argued that since the natural state of man was war, the state 
of peace “must be established”. He went on to detail three “definitive articles” through 




constitution of every nation should be republican” (Kant, 1983(1795): 111-2). Since that 
time scholars have debated the validity of these claims.  
 Liberal scholarship views the democratic peace as the ultimate realization of their 
empirical claims and the strongest refutation of realism. Steve Chan asserts that, “The 
democratic peace proposition is arguably one of the most robust generalizations that has 
been produced to date by this research tradition” (Chan, 1997: 60); John O’Neal and 
Bruce Russett start their work from the assumption that democracies very rarely, if ever, 
fight with one another (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 43); and Jack Levy, in an oft-quoted 
statement, proclaims the democratic peace to be the closest thing we have to an 
“empirical law” in international relations (Levy, 1988 quoted in Hobson, 2011: 1905).  
 Subscribers to the democratic peace have offered up two potential reasons for the 
existence of peace between democracies. The first is structural, in that democracy 
requires the will of the people for the continuation of government. As such, democratic 
states will be less likely to go to war because the people comprising the electorate – who 
have to bear the costs of war – will be unlikely to offer their consent (Doyle, 2005: 464). 
This phenomenon was coined “audience costs” by James Fearon (1994), who was 
echoing Kant: “If (as must inevitably be the case, given this form of constitution) the 
consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, 
it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky 




 The second explanatory factor posited for the democratic peace is the normative 
constraints imposed upon democratic governments. Doyle describes a situation whereby 
liberal principles add to international respect, and that these normative commitments are 
sustained by material incentives (Doyle, 2005: 464-5). These constraints are 
demonstrated by the “Kantian Triangle” of republican government, international trade, 
and international organizations and law (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 35), or in Doyle’s 
(2005) words, the “three pillars of the liberal peace”. Both the structural and normative 
causal variables are meant as explanatory mechanisms for the findings of numerous 
large-N studies that all reach the same conclusion when examining democratic dyads: the 
absence of war between them (Doyle, 1983; Russett and O’Neal, 2001; Cox and Drury, 
2006).  
 Realist scholars, on the other hand, have disagreed with both the theoretical and 
the empirical findings of the democratic peace. Realism rejects the claim that internal 
political structures can alter the systemic forces that lead to war. As Kenneth Waltz puts 
it, “in an anarchic realm, peace is fragile” (Waltz, 1988 reprinted in Betts, 2013: 104). 
This is counter to the claim of a democratic “perpetual peace” (Kant, 1795) offered by the 
democratic peace theory. Further, realists have questioned the empirical findings put 
forth to make the democratic peace generalization. David Spiro argues that the existence 
of “zero wars” between democracies is little better than random chance (Spiro, 1994: 62), 
and also that many more exceptions exist than democratic peace theorists are willing to 




Christopher Layne dismisses the structural constraint explanation in turn, stating that if 
such constraints did exist, democratic peace would not simply be a dyadic phenomenon, 
but also a monadic one (Layne, 1994: 7, 12). He also, like Spiro, argues that since 
democracy was rare for quite a large portion of human history, the findings may be 
biased because the large-N is not so large after all (Layne, 1994: 39). Sebastian Rosato 
levels criticism at the other explanatory variable, normative constraints, by criticizing the 
idea that “perceptions of democracy” can be measured and that such measurement would 
be ripe for constant “regime redefinition” (Rosato, 2003: 592-3).  
 The robustness of this debate tends to confirm the assertions of many that the 
democratic peace is the most sizable contribution to date of the liberal research tradition. 
Nevertheless, where does this leave the democratic peace in the twenty-first century? It is 
facing a number of scholarly and practical challenges. First, ever since Fukuyama 
declared the “end of history” and the subsequent lack of counter viewpoints to liberal 
democracy in the post-Cold War world (Fukuyama, 1989), the spread of democratic 
governance has broadened. As such, what was a “small-N” proposition now must spread 
to all corners of the globe and will be more thoroughly subjected to both the structural 
constraints of realists and the cultural level constraints of Huntington and others.
1
 
 At the scholarly level, other theoretical schools have begun to examine the 
democratic peace theory. Constructivism has added two additional viewpoints of the 




analysis on democratic peace. Oren discussed the importance of normalizing a definition 
of democracy that is compatible with the time-period in which it exists (Oren, 1994: 151). 
His works traces the views of nineteenth century American political scientists Woodrow 
Wilson and John Burgess to show how perceptions of a democratic Imperial Germany 
changed over the course of the early twentieth century (Oren, 1994: 169-77). Owen, for 
his part, uses four cases studies from United States foreign policy to demonstrate that “if 
its peers do not believe it is a liberal democracy, they will not treat it like one” (Owen, 
1994: 96). In other words, Oren and Owen both demonstrate that the perception of Other 
by a democratic Self in the context in which conflict is occurring – are they or are they 
not a democracy? – will have more bearing on the outbreak of escalation than will Polity 
scores looking back in hindsight. 
Constructivists have also contributed an idea from the Copenhagen School – 
securitization theory – to argue that identity is the key explanatory mechanism behind the 
democratic peace (Hayes, 2009: 4). Christopher Hobson, for his part, argues that the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theorizing should be applied to democratic peace (Hobson, 
2011). The progressive research tradition of democratic peace, now entering its third 
century, is being examined at a more varied level as its impact spreads to parts of the 
world that were considered only as colonial holdings in the time of Kant.  
 The realist critiques of democratic peace theory must be taken seriously. I tend to 
agree that significant conceptual issues regarding the definition of both democracy and 
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war (Rosato, 2003: 593) hinder the research program. I also agree with Spiro (1994: 62) 
and Layne (1994: 39) that the relative lack of democracies in the world, particularly in 
the nineteenth century, cast serious doubt upon the large-N empirical findings of many 
democratic peace theorists. Further, I fully accept the constructivists claims of Hayes and 
others who argue that the subjective reality of the “non-democratic other” can often times 
be more important than the objective reality of non-democratic governance (Hayes, 2009: 
4). While structural and normative constraints upon democratic government can be 
objectively measured, these constraints also must be viewed, as Owen and Oren detailed, 
in the subjective perception of the beholder – the democratic body politic.   
 My thesis will test these varying claims to scholarly legitimacy by exploring the 
explanatory power of their causal mechanisms when applied to enduring rivalries. 
Enduring rivalries are a good laboratory for democratic peace research for two reasons. 
First, they provide a unique opportunity to establish a most-similar system design 
between cases where many variables can be controlled. In fact, as William Thompson 
puts it, the critical defining characteristic of an enduring rivalry is “non-anonymity” 
between the members (Thompson, 2001: 561). Second, enduring rivalries will be of 
paramount importance as democracy spreads and the challenges to the democratic peace 
thesis increase. According the Diehl and Goertz (2001: 145-6), of the sixty-three 
enduring rivalries that had existed or were continuing in 1992, forty-nine (78%) of them 
contained at least one dyadic member outside of North America and Europe. This means 
                                                                                                                                                 




that as democratization spreads, and the challenge to the democratic peace theory 
becomes more abundant, one of the primary fault lines of conflict will be within enduring 
rivalries. Evidence of this was already seen in O’Neal and Russett’s list of “possible 
exceptions” to the democratic peace theory, which included the 1995 conflict between 
Ecuador and Peru, the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and the 1998-2000 
separatist war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 48). Both the 
Ecuador-Peru and India-Pakistan dyads were identified as enduring rivalries (Diehl and 
Goertz, 2000: 145-6; Bennett, 1997: 235-6), and the Eritrea-Ethiopia dyad was also 
identified as such by Thompson (2001: 571).  
 I accept the classification of these conflicts as exceptions to the democratic peace, 
and also accept that other exceptions exist. My thesis will examine six of these 
exceptions. Within each of three enduring rivalry dyads, two cases will be examined, one 
of which a case of conflict and subsequent escalation, the second a case of conflict 
lacking subsequent escalation. Three tests will be applied to each. First, did the 
constraints provided by two democratic states, when viewed objectively, have any 
bearing on the presence of the dependent variable (escalation – which will be defined as 
movement from threat to display of force, and display of force to use of force)? Second, 
did the perceptions of one dyadic member of the other’s democracy have any bearing on 
the presence of the dependent variable? Third, did other independent causal variables 




By conducting these tests, this thesis will add to the existing democratic peace 
literature in three ways. First, it will go beyond the conceptual quagmire of defining 
“war” by accepting all militarized interstate disputes (MID) between democracies as 
exceptions to the rule, in order to get a firmer grasp on what leads democracies towards 
more peaceful relations with each other. Second, by examining democratic peace in 
relation to enduring rivalries, it will provide insight into the application of the democratic 
peace in an area that is sure to become more pertinent in international relations. Third, it 
will utilize past cases to put securitization theory to a robust test in order to ascertain 
whether objective democratization or subjective democratization is more important for 

















Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz define an enduring rivalry as the existence of at least 
six dyadic disputes within a twenty-year period. This definition yields sixty-three 
enduring rivalries from 1816-1992, averaging close to thirty-eight years and fifteen 
conflicts each (Diehl and Goertz: 2000: 143-4). Their work served as the basis for 
numerous other scholars examining the field of enduring rivalries.  
Scott Bennett argues that enduring rivalries should not be measured temporally 
(Bennett, 1997: 227-8). His definition, which he calls “interstate rivalries,” provides a 
primary contribution by taking the Diehl and Goertz list and making the end dates more 
precise. By classifying an enduring rivalry not by counting the number of wars and the 
number of years, but rather by the outstanding nature of lingering issues - “Intuitively 
anything about which two states may seriously disagree” (Bennett, 1997: 230) – Bennett 
can more accurately pin down the starting and ending dates for numerous enduring 
rivalries. 
He uses as a case study the United States-British rivalry. Diehl and Goertz place 
the exact dates of the rivalry to be from 1837 to the start of the American Civil War in 
1861 (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 145). Bennett argues persuasively that the issues between 
the two states, namely boundary issues with Canada, British aid for the Confederacy, and 
colonial meddling by the British in North and South America, were not resolved until the 




of the rivalry (1837), but makes the claim that the end date could be either 1861, 1872, or 
1903, depending on how one looks upon the treaties which smoothed relations between 
the Trans-Atlantic states (Bennett, 1997: 238-9).  
Additionally, Bennett explores the France-German dyad and assigns a separate 
end date to it as well. Diehl and Goertz place the end of the enduring rivalry in 1945, the 
year in which the Third Reich was vanquished by the Allied Powers. Bennett, on the 
other hand, asserts that the final militarized dispute in 1954-5 over the re-armament of 
West Germany provides a more accurate concluding date (Bennett, 1997: 236), in that 
Germany accession into the Western European community settled any outstanding issues 
between the her and her continental neighbor. In conclusion, Bennett makes a compelling 
case that issue salience is the only true measure of the start, and conclusion, of enduring 
international rivalry (Bennett, 1997: 251).  
William Thompson assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both Diehl and 
Goertz’s work, as well as Bennett’s, and makes the case that four separate categories 
should exist to classify rivalry. The first is “enduring rivalries,” which is the classification 
given by Diehl and Goertz, the second and third are “interstate rivalries” and simply 
“rivalries,” two variations based on Bennett’s methodology, and the fourth is “strategic 
rivalry,” a category offered by Thompson (Thompson, 2001: 568-73). He argues that 
where these four classifications really part ways is in “the definitions of their concepts” 




placing too much emphasis on temporal dispute and year counting, while ignoring non-
militarized issue salience (Thompson, 2001: 569, 574).  
Thompson’s strategic rivalry classification has an impact on all three dyads under 
examination here. He classifies strategic rivalries as differing from the other 
classifications by being “non-dispute density” focused (Thompson, 2001: 582). In other 
words, just as Bennett had argued, so long as issue salience remains high, whether or not 
a militarized dispute occurs is irrelevant. An enduring rivalry is such not because of 
repeat militarized disputes, but because militarized disputes are an ever-present 
possibility. Thompson alters the dates for all three of the enduring rivalry dyads under 
examination here by utilizing this classification. He places the United States-Great 
Britain dyad from 1816-1904, the France-Germany dyad from 1816-1955, and the India-
Pakistan dyad from 1947-continuous as of 2001 (Thompson, 2001: 570-3).  
 
Democratic Peace Theory 
 The idea of a universal democratic peace is one of the most widely debated 
subjects in international relations, with literature stretching back at least to the late 
eighteenth century. Particularly during the latter years of the Cold War, and even more so 
after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the belief that democratic pairs of states do not fight 
with one another has gained significant scholarly appeal. Steve Chan details this lively 
debate, which he classifies as “progressive,” with a review of literature dating to Dean 




 While the empirical claim of the democratic peace – namely democracies rarely, 
if ever, fight wars with one another – has been largely accepted, the underlying debate 
surrounds two areas. First, scholars have debated the identity of a causal mechanism for 
the generalized relationship between democracy and peace. In other words, now that 
there is an established belief that “it is,” we must establish “why it is so”. Second, there is 
a debate regarding the dyadic or monadic existence of democratic peace. Chan states that 
there are two competing claims to the democratic peace: democracies are, in general, 
more peaceful than non-democracies (monadic peace); democracies are only more 
peaceful towards each other (dyadic peace) (Chan, 1997: 62).  
 Aside from these two larger debates, three other research questions challenge the 
democratic peace. First, the fact that the democratic peace is part and parcel to the 
underlying question of international relations, namely how to foster peace, assures that it 
is susceptible to numerous theoretical challenges to its claim, particularly from realists 
(Rosato, 2003; Layne, 1994; Bachteler, 1997; Gartzke, 2000; Spiro, 1994) but also 
increasingly from constructivists (Hayes, 2009; Hayes, 2012; Xenias, 2005) and critical 
theorists (Hobson, 2011; Gat, 2005). Second, the democratic peace has been undermined 
by the other two pillars of the “liberal peace” (Doyle, 2005). The idea that the internal 
political structure of the state causes peaceful relations is weakened by the assertion that 
it may just as well be caused by mutual membership in international organizations or by 
an international trade regime (Doyle, 1983; Doyle, 1986; Doyle, 2005; Cox and Drury, 




democratic peace theory relies on a highly contested concept as an independent variable 
(democracy) and a highly contested concept as a dependent variable (war). This 
conceptual cloudiness means that a significant amount of debate has been utilized on how 
to define each (Layne, 1994; Forsythe, 1992). Assessing the state of these five debates 
within the democratic peace field will aid my research by bringing clarity to the cases 
being studied and the variables by which to study them. 
 
Structural vs. Normative Constraints 
 The structural theory of democratic peace argues that the citizens comprising a 
democratic state will be disinclined to support aggressive action because they will 
ultimately bear the cost of such action. Kant summarized this logic as such: “For it does 
not require the moral improvement of man; it requires only that we know how to apply 
the mechanism of nature to men as to organize the conflict of hostile attitudes present in a 
people in such a way that they must compel one another to submit to coercive laws and 
thus to enter into a state of peace, where laws have power” (Kant, 1983(1795): 124). For 
him, men had it within their capability to be peaceful. What prevented peace were 
autocratic governments and the ability the fostered for unelected leaders to launch war, 
go about their business, and leave the bill to be picked up by the citizenry. Under 
structural logic, this would be unthinkable in a democracy.  
 Structural constraints consist of a number of individual variables. I will briefly 




cost theory argues that democratic leaders will be unlikely to launch military actions, 
unless they are assured of victory, for fear of electoral reprisal (Fearon, 1994). Hayes 
extends this viewpoint to include identity and securitization, by exploring the role of the 
democratic American public in refusing to securitize India in 1971, despite attempts by 
Nixon and Kissinger to convince them to do so, thereby essentially blocking military 
action between two democracies over Bangladesh (Hayes, 2012: 70).  
Audience cost theory has been critiqued on different levels. Rosato argues that 
autocrats could very well be even more susceptible to audience costs, in that they could 
lose their lives (Hitler, Mussolini, etc.) and not just an election (Rosato, 2003: 594). 
Alexander Downes, in another line of critique, demonstrates that audience costs can be 
compromised by domestic political concerns with a case-study of the United States’ 
decision to escalate hostilities with North Vietnam in 1965.
2
  
 The normative theory of democratic peace is intimately related to the prevailing 
dyadic nature of the theory. Normative school adherents argue that democracies enjoy 
more peaceful relations with one another because their respective cultures “emphasize the 
role of shared democratic principles, perceptions, and expectations of behavior” (O’Neal 
and Russett, 2001: 53).  Among these norms are a respect for sovereignty (Doyle, 1983: 
213) and the externalizing of democratic norms, such as the rule of law and human rights 
(Zinnes, 2004: 435). Maoz and Russett find that normative constraints tend to be more 
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“significant” than structural constraints when identifying the causes of democratic peace 
(Maoz and Russett, 1993: 634).  
 This is largely accepted by default. In many ways, in order to accept the structural 
constraints argument for the democratic peace, you would have to accept the monadic 
peace theory. Put another way, if audience costs, along with the other inhibiting structural 
factors of democracy (group constraint, slow mobilization, and transparency) (Rosato, 
2003: 594-8), were inhibitors of violence within democracy, why would they only inhibit 
violence towards other democracies? To paraphrase Rosato, if public constraint placed a 
limit on democracies war actions then they would be more pacific in general, not just 
towards other democracies (Rosato, 2003: 594). Normative constraints, as Maoz and 
Russett demonstrate, have empirical validity, but their acceptance is also required for the 
foundation of a dyadic democratic peace to hold.  
 
Dyadic vs. Monadic Democratic Peace 
 The idea of a monadic democratic peace has far less scholarly adherents than the 
dyadic variation. In fact, some of the largest proponents of democratic peace reject the 
idea that democracies are less war-prone than their autocratic counterparts. Maoz and 
Russett list the fact that “democracies are as war-prone as non-democracies” as one of the 
essential two criteria needed for the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 624). By 
this calculation, the democratic peace is viewed through the lens of the magic of 




pacific relations when mixed together. John MacMillan classifies it in a far less flattering 
light, describing a “separate democratic peace” (dyadic) as a “phantom” of which we 
should give up chasing (MacMillan, 2003: 237). Realists have been even harder on the 
idea of monadic peace; with Layne using it to dismiss the entire idea of structural 
constraints based on that the fact that a monadic peace does not exist (Layne, 1994: 12).  
 Even those who defend the idea of a monadic democratic peace, including Lars-
Erik Cederman, have to bolster their argument with other variables of the liberal peace. 
Cederman suggests that after three characteristics are in place – strategic tagging, 
ideological alliances, and collective security (Cederman, 2001: 475-7) – a normative 
process will take hold that will “take on a life of its own” (Cederman, 2001: 473). While 
his work provides a compelling case for this hypothesis, it is not exactly noteworthy that 
an international system whereby the norms of democracy, collective security alliances, 
and the combining of the “free world” would yield peace. If anything, this loosens the 
hold of domestic institutions as a primary causal variable. O’Neal and Russett find 
evidence for the monadic hypothesis, but classify the evidence as “controversial,” 
(O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 36) and Rousseau, et. al. finds some evidence for the monadic 
model as well, although their findings for the dyadic peace are far more substantial 
(Rousseau, et. al., 1996: 512).  
 The dyadic model of the democratic peace, on the other hand, enjoys robust 
support in the literature. O’Neal and Russett argue that, “Not only do democracies 




kinds of states to have serious military disputes or skirmishes with each other” (O’Neal 
and Russett, 2001: 36). Even Rosato, whose realist critique of the democratic peace 
theory found its mark on many claims, conceded that the empirical findings of the 
democratic peace were “robust” (Rosato, 2003: 585).  
 Examining contemporary world events helps to highlight this dichotomous 
debate. The United States may very well not be at war, or be at risk of war, with a major 
democratic power, but they, the world’s oldest and arguably most well-respected 
democracy, have initiated wars in the past decade with Iraq and Afghanistan (Hobson, 
2011: 1904) and are currently attempting to securitize Iran (Hayes, 2009: 979). The 
democratic peace rises and falls on its dyadic claim.  
 
Other Causal Variables 
Aside from mutual levels of democracy, numerous other independent variables 
have been put forward to explain the dependent variable of conflict escalation and 
challenge the democratic peace thesis. These include the existence of a security alliance, 
power imbalance, contiguity, existence of a great power within the dyad, hegemonic 
stability, civilizational differences, nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence, and 
common IGO membership (O’Neal and Russett, 2001). I will very briefly review some of 







 Karl Deutsch defined a security community as “a group of people which had 
become integrated” (Deutsch, 1969(1957): 5). Speaking specifically about the North 
Atlantic area in the post-World War Two era, Deutsch argues that integration has 
occurred when “dependable expectations” of peaceful change among the members exists 
(Deutsch, 1969(1957): 5). It is no accident that Deutsch lists the experience of the early 
American states as his first case of a successful security community (Deutsch, 
1969(1957): 16). Alexander Hamilton hailed the benefit of thirteen individual states 
joining to “resist a common enemy,”
3
 and Deutsch recognized this as an early example of 
a security community in the grouping of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The Deutschian ideal of “dependable expectations” would, if true, supplant the 
democratic peace claims to providing much the same causal mechanisms. 
 
Power Imbalance, Contiguity, and Great Power Dyads 
 Thucydides recounted an exchange between the Athenians and the Melians, 
where a simple choice was put to the weaker party. The Athenians, enjoying a sizable 
power imbalance, implored the Melians to surrender peacefully and avoid war. The logic, 
to the Athenians at least, was self-explanatory: “the strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must”.
4
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 While this episode resulted in a war due to the Melian refusal to surrender, the 
logic remains the same. Large power imbalances could offset war in that the weaker party 
would find the initiation of a war to be both irrational and detrimental to their security. 
Layne argues that “international political behavior is characterized by continuity, 
regularity, and repetition because states are constrained by the international system’s 
unchanging (and probably unchangeable) structure” (Layne, 1994: 10-1). This structure, 
according to Waltz, is anarchic and driven by rational, self-maximizing states. In other 
words, the drive for the accumulation of power means that states will be unable to break 
out of the security dilemma, whether or not they are democratic (Layne, 1994: 12).  
 The realist variable of power imbalance is intimately related to the variables of 
contiguity and the existence of a great power dyad. As was mentioned earlier, Bennett 
displayed the importance of “issue salience” (Bennett, 1997: 251) on the continuation of 
enduring international rivalry. Clearly, very few issues in a security-seeking realm have 
higher salience than that of contiguity. Quoting Vasquez, Diehl and Goertz goes so far as 
to state that geographical contiguity was the “critical factor” for whether or not conflict 
within an enduring rivalry dyad would escalate (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 156).  
Much the same can be said for the existence of a great power within a dyad. Just 
as a dyad separated by thousands of miles, for example Argentina and Mali, would rarely 
find a reason to go to war, so too will great power-minor power dyads rarely go to war. 
The Melian outcomes are most likely: the weaker nation acquiesces, or the larger nation 




most times are at peace” (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 81). With this reality, we can not 
credit democratic peace for preventing conflict between dyads who for either power 
imbalance, contiguity, or great power status, chose to not go enter a conflict.  
 
Hegemonic Stability  
 Hegemonic stability, either regionally or globally, is a double-edged sword for 
conflict. On one hand, it can reduce the likelihood of conflict and tamper its intensity. On 
the other, it could be a catalyst for a major-power war, regardless of the democratic status 
of the states involved. 
 Robert Gilpin tells us that declining hegemons face two options in order to bring 
their capabilities and commitments in to balance. The first is to retrench, or reduce 
commitments. Prima facie, this means that the existing hegemon was policing their 
region or the globe prior to this retrenchment. This could be a source for peace. However, 
once that decline has begun, the other option is to fight a hegemonic war for control of 
the system. In this way, hegemony can be a source of significant conflict (Gilpin, 1981).  
 
Civilizational Differences  
 Aside from the democratic nature of government, a clear fault line between two 
states can be the cultural differences between them. Huntington, in The Clash of 
Civilizations?, defined a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people”. Shortly 




government or power, will be the new division between peoples.
5
 O’Neal and Russett 
devote an entire chapter of their work to addressing the claims made by Huntington, 
concluding that empirical testing shows that “there is little evidence civilizations clash” 
(O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 256-7).  
 Nevertheless, Anastasia Xenias aptly applied this theory to the democratic peace. 
Xenia rightly characterizes civilization as a “fact,” a form of zero-sum thinking that leads 
to conflict. She goes on to say that “divisions are a fact, not a normative judgment,” 
(Xenias, 2005: 373) and therefore, conflict arising from them would pose yet another 
challenge to the democratic peace theory. This would significantly cloud the democratic 
perceptions of states across cultural lines. She argues that “in-group vs. out-group” lines 
have the longest history in international relations, and “if the dividing line is civilization, 
it can not be erased” (Xenias, 2005: 374). In other words, if civilization is involved, 
perpetual peace becomes unobtainable. 
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
 No matter ones position on the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
you would be hard pressed to downplay their significance to international relations. John 
Mearsheimer extolled their “pacifying effects” when he warned us all that we would 
“miss the Cold War,” in part because of the peace kept by mutually assured destruction in 
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 This variable can certainly not be discounted when considering causes 
for peace.  
 However, like hegemonic stability, the effects of nuclear weapons can be both 
positively and negatively related to the dependent variable of conflict escalation. While 
Mearsheimer demonstrates that the “Long Peace” in Western Europe can indeed be 
explained in part by nuclear deterrence, Akisato Suzuki and Neophytos Loizides showed 
the opposite effects in South Asia. Discussing the India-Pakistan conflict, Suzuki and 
Loizides found that “security dilemmas at the unconventional/sub-conventional level 
(terrorism) were intensified rather than reduced by nuclear deterrence” (emphasis in 
original) (Suzuki and Loizides, 2011: 33). While the Cold War may be missed in Europe, 
it is not certain whether Cold War-level proliferation will be a welcome addition for 
peace everywhere. 
 
Economic Interdependence and IGO Membership 
 Kant described “three definitive articles of peace” (Kant, 1983(1795): 
112,115,118). In addition to democratic government, these articles include international 
organizations and “cosmopolitan law,” or in modern usage, free trade. Subsequently these 
have been defined as a “Kantian Triangle” (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 35) and “three 
pillars of liberal peace” (Doyle, 2005). No matter the name, the addition of economic 
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interdependence and international organization membership are competing variables to 
the democratic peace theory. 
 Dan Cox and Cooper Drury, in a critique of the “three pillars” argument, 
demonstrate that bilateral trade and economic sanctions are not inversely related (Cox 
and Drury, 2006: 717). Mousseau, on the other hand, claims that economic development 
and democratic culture go together and that obtaining one without the other is unlikely 
(Mousseau, 2000: 473). Henderson claims that neoidealism rests not on democratic 
structures, but rather international regimes, and that those regimes are the causal 
mechanism towards peace observed by democratic peace (Henderson, 1999: 203-4). 
Doyle asserts that the existence of all three variables is required in order to obtain an 
“evolution towards peace” (Doyle, 1986: 1159), and in a later response to Rosato, Doyle 
makes the following declarative statement: “No one of these constitutional, international 
or cosmopolitan sources is sufficient, but together (and only where together) they 
plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained 
liberal peace” (Doyle, 2005: 463). When assessing democratic peace, these additional 









Conceptual Clarity: Democracy and War 
 Both the independent variable and the dependent variable of most past work on 
the democratic peace are contested concepts. O’Neal and Russett are guided by a 
procedural definition of democracy, emphasizing the characteristics that most citizens 
can vote, that the government has come to power in a free and fair election comprised of 
at least two competitive parties, and that the executive is either popularly elected or held 
accountable by a popularly elected legislature (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 44). Chan 
discusses the disputed nature of the concept at length, and draws a distinction between 
“democratization” and “consolidated democracy,” (Chan, 1997: 65-6) a distinction which 
is important for the democratic peace. Robinson, in attempting to generalize the concept 
of democracy back to Ancient Greece, quotes Weart who asserted that a democracy must 
be consolidated for “at least three years” before the democratic peace would apply 
(Robinson, 2001: 595). Even Kant drew a distinction between “republican government,” 
which he defined as separating executive from legislative power, and “democracy,” 
which he defined as despotism (Kant, 1983(1795): 114).  
 The research field has largely settled on the Polity III data set for a quantitative 
guide to democratization (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 1997; Spiro, 1994: 55). But even 
this trusted 21-point scaling system, which ranks the democratic and autocratic 
characteristics of states back to 1800, raises conceptual questions. Let us examine an 
example from this research to highlight some of the pitfalls. Layne argues that a possible 




argument despite the fact that Polity III code’s Britain’s polity score for 1812 at -2, with a 
democratic score of four and an autocratic score of six. The United States received a 
Polity coding of 9 in 1812.
7
  
 The individual researcher now faces a choice. One could discard this exception as 
being insufficiently so, in that empirically the United States-Great Britain dyad of 1812 is 
not a mutually democratic dyad. However, I would not be so quick to dismiss Layne’s 
suggestion. The British allowed restricted franchise, just as the United States did. Neither 
state was anywhere near liberal in the modern sense, but the British had banned the slave 
trade five years earlier while the United States had a slave owner occupying the White 
House. If anything, this case demonstrates Oren’s caution against the bias of democratic 
“coding,” stating that we must be careful to not make the United States the standard by 
which all other states, at all points in time, are judged (Oren, 1994: 150). 
 Conceptual clarity has been equally elusive in regards to the dependent variable: 
war. Most scholars rely on the Correlates of War Data, which following the lead of 
Singer and Small (1972) places the definition of war at 1,000 battlefield deaths in 
interstate combat
8
. Here, too, the quest for parsimonious definitions has posed significant 
concerns. Both Layne and Spiro raised legitimate questions over the consideration of 
Civil War, particularly in the United States, as a form of “interstate conflict” (Layne, 
1994: 40; Spiro, 1994: 59). Additionally, numerous authors raised concerns over the 
discounting of United States covert interventions during the Cold War, particularly in 
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Guatemala and Chile (Spiro, 1994: 60; O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 62; Rosato, 2003: 
590). 
 Another illustrative case can be found within this research. Layne utilizes as a 
case study the Ruhr Crisis of 1923, involving France and Weimar Germany, where the 
French seized the Ruhr region ostensibly as retribution for missed reparation payments 
under the Versailles Treaty. While it was reported that “murder, rape, robbery, 
deportation, and evacuations”
9
 were essentially daily occurrences, it is not clear whether 
1,000 deaths were reached at all, and it is certainly clear that these deaths were not 
battlefield related. Most reports place the culprits as French soldiers, but the victims as 
passive German resistors to the French incursion.
10
 On one hand, Polity places both these 
states as democratic, while on the other hand, the Correlates of War does not list this as a 
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Variables and Operationalization 
Dependent Variable: Escalated Interstate Conflict 
 I will classify conflict using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data from 
the Correlates of War Project, Version 3.0. This data is far more encompassing than the 
Correlates of War data on the categorization of war, in that it includes “every threat, 
display, or use of force” between member states.
11
 Escalation shall exist when threat 
moves to a display of force, and a display to a use of force. As previously stated, I accept 
the classification by Layne and others of these cases as exceptions to the democratic 
peace theory, and the research will focus instead on the impact that democratic 
perceptions had on the decision to escalate by one or both members of an enduring 
rivalry dyad. 
 
Independent Variable 1: Democratic Perception 
 Owen makes the persuasive case that it is whether or not a state perceives another 
as democratic, not whether it is objectively so on a coding scale decades into the future, 
that influences decisions for war or peace. Further, it is the failure to accept the role of 
subjectivity that prevents democratic peace theorists from grappling effectively with 
exceptions (Owen, 1994: 96-7). Oren agrees, arguing that a pro-American bias in the 
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coding data sets makes it essential that we view democracy not from historical hindsight, 
but from the prevailing normative benchmarks of individual period time (Oren, 1994: 
151).  
The role of securitization must be added to the concept of democratic perceptions, 
particularly when dealing with democratic polities.  Jarrod Hayes offered that the idea of 
successful securitization – the argument that an actor poses an existential threat to the 
state (Hayes, 2009: 982) – is the key determinant in the democratic research program. 
Further, it is the acceptance by the public of such an argument that delineates democracy 
from other forms of government. In other words, in democracy, the public has to agree 
with the securitization posturing of the government. Hayes argues that “shared 
democratic identity makes it very difficult for political leaders within democracies to 
successfully argue that another democracy poses an existential threat—a critical 
component to the securitization move” (Hayes, 2009: 4).  
 Hayes’ work is notable in that it brings to bear a new wrinkle in democratic peace 
studies. He utilizes the case studies of US-India and US-China relations to demonstrate 
the different capabilities of a democratic polity in securitization, against one state where a 
shared democratic “in-group” is perceived, and another where a distinctive “out-group” 
feeling exists (Hayes, 2009: 983). This work plans to build on that work by testing 
democratic perception as the key independent variable, while controlling for other 
variables. Additionally, by tracing the perceptions of the public within enduring rivalry 




(Thompson, 2001: 561), we will be able to more clearly ascertain whether it is democracy 
or the initiating public’s perception of “others” democracy that truly matters when 
studying the democratic peace.   
 How then do we gauge public perception of democratization? According to 
Hayes, the Copenhagen School defines three characteristics for securitization. First, 
leaders engage in a “speech act” that places the target as an existential threat, or in 
Hayes’ words, uses the “grammar of security”. Second, the actor possesses the social 
capital or authority to make such a statement. Third, the securitizing entity will describe 
the role of the external actor meant to be threatening, in this case, a non-democratic entity 
(Hayes, 2012: 66).  
 In democracy, however, this is only the first phase. The second is the reception 
and reaction of the public to the securitization message. This process should also consist 
of three components. First, the in-group/out-group message is received by the public. 
Second, an opposition to securitization arises, based on the fact that the target is a 
democracy. Third, this opposition exerts influence over state leadership, and weakens the 
move towards securitization (Hayes, 2012: 70).  
 Supportive evidence during the securitization phase can be obtained by utilizing 
primary source documentation from key decision-makers and the general public. 
Particularly of importance is the reaction of the opposition during the securitization threat 
of a fellow democracy. It is axiomatic that a securitizing party will invoke the language 




2012). However, in a democracy, this language must also be buttressed by an assertion 
that the enemy state is also void of democratic credentials. As such, I will focus my 
research on the public statements of both securitizing and opposition party members, 
including speeches, newspaper articles, opinion editorials, and records of public protest. 
Additionally, securitization will also be examined as an electoral process. If audience cost 
theory holds, it will be most pronounced in the election results that surround a move 
towards securitizing another democracy. I will apply a static list of coding terms to assess 
the perception of democracy to ensure that all data is interviewed in a standard way in 
order to avoid bias. 
For my hypothesis to hold, the following process should be observed: in an 
escalated conflict, the securitizing party should invoke both the language of security and 
assert that the opposing state is not democratic, while the opposition party should assert 
that the opposing state is democratic, with the securitizing party winning out with the 
public; in a de-escalated conflict, both the securitizing and opposition parties should 










Independent Variable 2: Empirical Democracy 
 For this study to be truly robust, I will also consider whether it is empirical 
democracy that makes the difference in decisions to escalate conflict within enduring 
rivalry dyads. I will measure democracy by using Polity 3.0 scores along a 21-point 
coding scale. 
 
Independent Variable 3: Power Imbalance 
 Power imbalance can be measured using the Correlates of War, Composite Index 
of National Capabilities (CINC), version 4.0. There is one exception. The data table only 
stretches back to 1816, meaning that I will be unable to obtain CINC data for the United 
States and Great Britain in 1811, the year preceding the start of the War of 1812. For this 
dyad-year I use the 1816 data, as I find no reason to believe any discernible difference 
would exist between the general military capabilities of the two states between 1811 and 
1816. 
 
Independent Variable 4: Economic Interdependence 
 Following O’Neal and Russett, I utilize the Statesman’s Yearbook for trade data 
prior to 1918, the League of Nations from 1920-1938, and the IMF in the post-World 
War Two era (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 139-40). This information is compiled by the 





Independent Variable 5: IGO Membership 
 I utilize the Correlates of War IGO Data, version 2.1. Again, the exception is the 
United States-Great Britain dyad in 1811. I will utilize the 1815 data, as I see no reason 
why this would have undergone a substantial change in that time frame. 
 
Independent Variable 6: Great Power Dyad 
 The Correlates of War lists Great Britain as a great power from 1815-1992, 
France from 1815-1992, Germany from 1885-1945, and the United States from 1898-
1992 (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 101-2).  
 
Control Variables 
 In addition to the independent variables of this research, enduring rivalry dyads 
allow us to control for a number of variables within a most similar systems design model. 
The following variables were unchanged within the three enduring rivalry dyads over the 
course of both case studies within each. 
 
Control Variable 1: Security Alliance 
 In order to determine whether joint membership in a security alliance existed, I 
will utilize the Correlates of War Main Alliance data, version 3.03. In this, and all 




previous year of the conflict (O’Neal and Russett, 2001). As this data would be the most 
up to date that leaders would have, it is important to recognize this in the research. 
 
Control Variable 2: Hegemonic Stability 
 I utilize the definition offered for global hegemony by O’Neal and Russett, 
recognizing Great Britain as the global hegemon prior to 1945, and the United States 
thereafter (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 185).  
 
Control Variable 3: Civilizational Differences 
 Huntington provides a specific list of civilizational differences, consisting of 
seven (and perhaps eight) global civilizations (Xenias, 2005: 372). I utilize this list to 
classify the civilization group of each dyad under review.  
 
Control Variable 4: Nuclear Deterrence 
 Recognizing that nuclear deterrence may lead to peaceful relations between states, 
regardless of the political system of each, I classify a dyad as either both states possessing 








Control Variable 5: Contiguity 
 Contiguity is measured by the existence of a common boundary between either of 
the two states’ territorial boundaries, the territorial boundaries of their colonial holdings, 
or the colonial holdings of one and the territorial boundary of the other (O’Neal and 
Russett, 2001: 101).  
 
Case Selection 
 As previously mentioned, this research will focus on three enduring rivalry dyads: 
Anglo-American (1775-1903), Franco-German (1905-1955), and Indo-Pakistani (1947-
Continous). The six conflict case studies will be of the War of 1812 and the Caroline 
Affair (Anglo-American), the Ruhr Crisis and the German Re-Armament Crisis (Franco-
German), and the Kargil War and the Mumbai Terror Attack Crisis (Indo-Pakistani). 
These case studies were selected based on three factors. First, they represent “hard 
cases” for the democratic peace theory, in that the outcomes of all six incidents under 
review were militarized interstate disputes. Second, all three dyads have been utilized by 
critics of the democratic peace as notable exceptions to the theory, and as such, provide a 
prime opportunity to explore why such exceptions took place. Third, and most 
importantly, the cases under review allow for a most similar systems case study design 
that should yield valuable results. 
 These cases were selected based on the dependent variable. By that I mean that 




case of conflict either with less escalation or without escalation. While I fully recognize 
the potential pitfalls in this manner of case selection
12
, I believe that it is both warranted 
and extremely valuable in this research project. According to George and Bennett, “cases 
selected on the dependent variable…can help identify which variables are not necessary 
or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome” (George and Bennett, 2005: 23). Such 
shall be the goal of this research. For example, by comparing two separate points in the 
lifespan of an enduring rivalry, many if not all independent variables can be controlled 
for. Contiguity does not change rapidly, and civilization not-at-all. Nuclear deterrence 
appears in both the 1999 and 2008 case studies within the India-Pakistan dyad, and of 
course does not exist in the earlier cases of the United States-Great Britain and France-
Germany. In short, these cases are appropriate for selection based on the dependent 
variable.  
Additionally, these cases provide the opportunity to engage in detailed and in-
depth process-tracing, whereby the weight of certain causal variables can be determined 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 27). Process tracing, as detailed by George and Bennet, 
examines “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see 
whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in 
the sequence and values of the intervening variables in this case” (George and Bennet, 
2005: 6). For example, it is highly possible that a host of factors caused the French to 
escalate in the Ruhr in 1923 and then stand-down over German re-armament in 1954-5, 
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not least of which being the newly formed security alliance in Europe and the existence 
of a United States hegemonic presence. However, it is also possible that France had 
grown to perceive West Germany as a democratic ally, and these processes may have 
affected the norms of both states. Process tracing through case studies will allow this 
exploration to be furthered.  
Further, I feel that the amount of variables under consideration – eleven when 
including our controls – and the hypotheses derived therefrom – that each IV is the cause 
of the DV – will ensure sufficient independence between the cases. In other words, I feel 
that this research will be governed with an exhaustive list of hypotheses under 
consideration, and provide the independence of each case under consideration from the 
one preceding it (George and Bennett, 2005: 33). 
Finally, I acknowledge that both parsimony and generalizability will be sacrificed, 
as George and Bennett discuss, for the sake of “contingent generalizations” that apply to 
types and sub-types of cases
13
. For this reason, my case selection reflects a Trans-
Atlantic, single great power dyad; a continental, two-great power dyad; and a periphery, 
contiguous, non-great power dyad. The research is post-positivist by design, in that I do 
not pretend to be researching towards a finding that can posit neither a “general law” nor 
“tendencies that underlie behavior” (George and Bennett, 2005: 31). 
It goes without saying that whether or not a state viewed another as democratic is 
case-specific, and contingent generalizations are the best that can be hoped for. But, if 
                                                                                                                                                 




one is to believe that anarchy truly is “what states make of it”
14
 and that in democracies, 
the people serving as “securitization audiences” (Hayes, 2012: 70) provide the last great 
line of defense between a Waltzian anarchy and a Wendtian anarchy, then the 
information these cases provide will be worth having. Ultimately, the research of these 
cases will answer the critical question posed by Harvey Starr about the democratic peace: 














                                                                                                                                                 
13
 Ibid: 31 
14
 See Anarchy is What States Make of It in “Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and 






Chapter Two  




 Beginning with the hostilities surrounding the American War of Independence in 
1775, the United States and Great Britain became locked in an enduring rivalry 
relationship that spanned until at least 1861 (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 145) and perhaps as 
long as 1904 (Thompson, 2001: 570). This chapter will examine two conflictual points 
within this relationship, the first being a case of escalated conflict that occurred between 
1803-1812 and ultimately led to the War of 1812, and the second a case of non-escalated 
conflict occurring between 1837-1842, surrounding territorial disputes in Upstate New 
York and the Aroostook region of Maine.  
Both cases presented here resulted from disputes over the territorial integrity of 
the United States; both cases had significant issues arising from trading partnerships; and 
both cases occurred prior to the United States’ ascendance to great power status (O’Neal 
and Russett, 2001: 101-2). After controlling for numerous variables, I will examine the 
possible explanatory variables for the differing outcomes of escalation in the two cases. 
 This chapter will proceed as follows. I will examine the events surrounding the 
securitization efforts preceding the conflicts of 1812 and 1837 in turn. Each case study 




First, I will briefly detail the context and background of each case. Second, I will 
examine the respective attempts at securitization by the leaders of both Great Britain and 
the United States in the lead-up to conflict. Third, I will discuss the opposition to 
securitization that occurred in both Great Britain and the United States in the lead-up to 
each conflict. Fourth, I will answer, in each case, whether the threat was successfully 
securitized by the elites and general public in either Great Britain and/or the United 
States. Fifth, I will examine the potential explanatory variables that could account for the 
differing outcomes in securitization between the cases. Sixth, I will briefly conclude the 
chapter by discussing the most likely explanatory variable.  
 
Anglo-American Dyad Case One: War of 1812, 1803-1812 
 
Case Background  
 
The War of 1812, which took place between the United States and Great Britain 
from 1812-15, occurred in the midst of over one hundred years of hostility between the 
two nations dating to the commencement of the American War of Independence in 1775. 
My research will focus on the period from 1803-1812, from the outbreak of a second 
Anglo-French war that “entangled the U.S. merchant marine” (Owen, 1994: 108) up to 
the declaration of war on June 18, 1812. The time period was described appropriately by 
Latimer, who stated that “The grievances against European powers for interfering with 




stream of events for more than a decade” (Latimer, 1956: 914). I will analyze what led to 
this ‘continuous stream of events’ towards war. 
 The War of 1812 represents a case of escalated conflict between the United States 
and Great Britain, and occurred within the context of a dyadic enduring rivalry and 
multinational international crisis. The United States had been maintaining tortured 
neutrality between France and Britain, who had been at war since 1793, despite the 
difficulty of maintaining neutrality in the early nineteenth century world of international 
affairs (Bukovansky, 1997: 222), and were continuing to do so in 1803 when the conflict 
with Britain restarted. This neutrality became even more tortured when, in 1807, the HMS 
Leopard fired at, impressed the sailors of, and captured the USS Chesapeake off the coast 
of Virginia (Hatzenbuehler and Ivie, 1980: 464). This led to the passage of the 1807 
Embargo Act (Kaplan, 1957: 199), which attempted to fortify the American neutrality 
position, but also placed President Thomas Jefferson at odds with those hardline 
members of his own Democratic-Republican Party who sought war with Great Britain. 
Furthering the move towards war, the election in 1810 of the Twelfth United States 
Congress, often referred to as “the War Hawk Congress,” brought to Washington, DC a 
group of young Democratic-Republicans bent on war with Great Britain (Risjord, 1961; 
Hatzenbuehler, 1972). Their election, and the continued hold on the White House by a 
fellow Democratic-Republican, James Madison, provided another critical turning point in 







Attempts at securitization, a concept discussed at length in Chapter One, by 
Democratic –Republicans were consistent and vigorous. Hatzenbuehler and Ivie identify 
“two sets” of categories in which these pro-war messages can be classified. The first were 
the “intrinsic harmfulness” arguments. These included the impressment of American 
sailors, seizure of ships, and the deprivation of commerce – both agricultural and 
industrial – that accompanied these British policies. This first category closely aligns 
with the “language of security” that might be expected from any party seeking a march to 
war.  
 The second category is described as the “lawlessness of nations” argument, and 
details slights to the universal law of nations and to the rights of man that had been 
committed by both France and Britain since the start of their conflict. Clearly, the largest 
of these was the infringement on the international right to free travel and commerce of 
the seas, but also included perceived infringements on United States sovereignty and the 
independence of nations throughout the Western Hemisphere (Hatzenbuehler and Ivie, 
1980: 464-5). This second category neatly aligns with the hypothesis that, after providing 
a language of security to the debate, the securitizing party in a democracy will assert that 
the opposition does not share their democratic values.  
 My research, presented in this chapter, largely confirms the twin categorizations 




potency of the Democratic-Republican message, stretching over half a decade, displays a 
finely tuned political operation scarcely rivaled even today. In his Seventh Annual 
Message to Congress, Jefferson stated that "These aggravations (British impressment) 
necessarily lead to the policy either of never admitting an armed vessel into our harbors, 
or of maintaining in every harbor such an armed force as may constrain obedience to the 





 The partisan press, which was the chief mode of political advocacy during the 
early nineteenth century, applied consistent pressure to the forces of war over the next 
three years preceding the election of the War Hawk Congress. The New York Evening 
Post, which had at one time been the vehicle of Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Party, 
even declared in the wake of the Chesapeake Affair that “…we are ready to say that we 
consider the national sovereignty has been attacked, the national honor tarnished, and that 





 In another hot-bed of Federalism, the Boston Gazette published a 
humorous allegory about a starving farmer, who realized that his livelihood had dried up 
while ironically attempting to starve out a woodchuck, in order to demonstrate the 
foolhardy policy of attempting to embargo the British into good behavior.
19
 And the 
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Aurora General Advertiser summarized the securitization message with this rebuke of 
Jefferson in 1809: 
“The crisis comes upon us now, when we must look to our own security, and the policy 
which is best adapted to ensure our rights and our prosperity. France has fought our 
battles - had Britain triumphed, we should have been enslaved. 
We can have no natural sympathies for a government which has tyrannised over us in 
every shape - which has murdered, torn from their homes, and plundered our citizens, 
insulted our flag, our territory, and our independence - and trampled upon the laws of 
civilized nations”.
20
 (Italics added) 
  
With the arrival in Washington of the War Hawk Congress in early 1811, 
securitization moved forward in earnest. John C. Calhoun (DR-SC), a newly elected 
member from South Carolina, a state Latimer dubbed the “protagonist of the War of 
1812,” delivered multiple speeches in pursuit of war. His first, occurring on December 
11, 1811, stated that it was the primary pursuit of any great nation to protect their citizens 
in the private endeavor of commerce (Latimer, 1956: 915). His second went quite a bit 
further. He stated in no uncertain terms that “for what is an inherent right, for what I 
deem the legitimate, or necessary carrying trade, the liberty of carrying our productions 
to foreign markets, and with the return cargo, in which agriculture is particularly 
interested, I would fight in defence of”.
21
 In a similar vein, Felix Grundy (DR-TN), a 
newly elected Congressmen from Tennessee, declared that “The true question in 
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controversy . . . involves the interest of the whole nation. It is the right of exporting the 
productions of our own soil and industry to foreign markets”.
22
 
 Not to be outdone, Speaker of the House and prolific War Hawk Henry Clay (DR-
KY) leveled this criticism of Great Britain: 
“We are invited, conjured to drink the potion of British poison actually presented to our 
lips, that we may avoid the imperial dose prepared by perturbed imaginations. We are 
called upon to submit to debasement, dishonor, and disgrace—to bow the neck to royal 




These Congressional speeches preceded the actual request for war with Great 
Britain that President Madison sent to Congress on June 1, 1812. In it, he stated that 
“British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the 
great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it, not in 
the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of 
a municipal prerogative over British subjects”.
24
 Two portions of this statement are of 
note. First, Madison continued the language of security surrounding maritime rights as 
the reason for pending conflict. Second, he draws a coded distinction between “American 
citizens” and “British subjects” that was prevalent in pro-war rhetoric of this time period. 
 It is telling that this message echoed as part of the overall securitizing message of 
the Democratic-Republican Party, a message that was consistently spreading the 
language of a democratic United States, yearning to trade free, while a tyrannical and 
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monarchical Britain menaced the high seas. The Washington National Examiner drew 
this distinction between negotiating with France, perceived by many as a democratic 
other, and Great Britain: 
“Let war therefore be forthwith proclaimed against England. With her there can be no 
motive for delay. Any further discussion, any new attempt at negotiation, would be as 
fruitless as it would be dishonorable. With France we shall be at liberty to pursue the 
course which circumstances may require. The advance she has already made by a repeal 
of her decrees; the manner of its reception by the government, and the prospect which 
exists of an amicable accommodation, entitle her to this preference. If she acquits herself 
to the just claims of the United States, we shall have good cause to applaud our conduct 





Further, on the eve of Madison’s War Message, the Niles Weekly Register 
(Baltimore) also displayed the United States as peace-loving and deliberate and Great 
Britain as anything but, by stating that “It is very certain that no good citizen of the 
United States would wantonly promote a rupture with Great Britain, or any other country. 
The American people will never wage offensive war; but every feeling of the heart is 




 Across the Atlantic, the British were far less occupied with America than vice-
versa. In fact, according to the journal of Henry Goulburn, a British diplomat who was 
involved in multiple facets of the war and peace negotiations, the June, 1812 United 
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States “declaration of war was unexpected” (Jones, 1958: 484). What little they did 
consider it revolved not around trading rights, but the ongoing campaign by the United 
States military to seize the colony of Canada from Britain, or in Goulburn’s words: “The 
real object of the war on the part of the United States, viz., the conquest of the Canada’s 
might be the result” (Jones, 1958: 484). 
 Great Britain was not nearly as concerned with the United States largely because 
she was chiefly concerned with the ongoing European war against Napoleon, a conflict 
with wide ranging implications for European balance of power politics. It was these 
considerations that led King George III to issue Orders in Council on November 11, 
1807, which authorized the seizure and impressment of any ship from a neutral nation 
carrying goods to France.
27
 These Orders shattered the already fragile United States 
neutrality. While the securitization message of such a move clearly included a ‘language 
of security’, no debate was necessary inside a royal council. Parliamentary opposition did 
arise, but the Orders in Council remained in effect until June, 1812, too late to cease the 
United States from declaring war. These feeble deliberations are an example of why 
Owen declared that “by my definition, Britain (in 1812) can not be considered a liberal 
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Opposition to Securitization 
  
The attempted securitization within the United States occurred in line with the 
hypothesis being tested. The language of security was employed consistently and 
vigorously, placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of Great Britain and pinpointing 
maritime seizure and impressment as the causes for conflict, along with the slights to 
national honor and economy that it would accompany. Further, Great Britain was 
demonized as the non-democratic Other, utilizing language such as “tyrannized,” 
“enslaved,” “British poison,” “royal insolence,” “British subjects,” and “dishonorable 
negotiations”. The question of this research then becomes: would opponents counter that 
Great Britain was in fact democratic, and therefore worthy of continued negotiation? 
 In this early phase of American democratization, and an even earlier phase of the 
British process, the answer appears to be that they did not. Owen asserts that “very few 
Americans, and virtually no British, considered Great Britain a democracy at the time” 
(Owen, 1994: 108). My research again largely confirms these results. However, it also 
shows that many Americans did not consider themselves democratic, nor did most 
members of the opposition consider the process of democratization to be a positive one. 
 The opposition Federalist Party had, by the time of the war crisis, established two 
defining identities for itself. First, it was viewed by most Americans as a pro-British 
party, stretching back to the first war crisis in the late 1790’s which resulted, under the 




(Owen, 1994: 105-8). Second, it was considered to be an anti-democratic party, 
highlighted by the ideology of its founder Hamilton, who called for a lifetime 





 and declared, on the night before the duel which ended his life, that 
“Democracy is our real disease” (underline in original).
30
 These identities were embraced 
during the debate over war with Great Britain. 
 Opposition tended to fall in to two categories, aligning with the two identifies of 
the Federalist Party. The first, which attempted to directly rebut the perceived impact on 
national honor and economy, argued that the United States would end up more 
economically impaired by war than by peace and that the honor of the nation would be 
destroyed by an impending military defeat. Federalists, in the words of Strum, saw the 
war as one “for unprofitable conquest,” (Strum, 1980: 171) and therefore opposed the 
move on the grounds of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This rhetorical answer can be 
seen in the speech given by Congressman Samuel Taggart (F-MA), who delivered one of 
the first anti-war messages in the history of the United States Congress. He stated that, 
“Admitting war to be sincerely intended, no course could be devised more inconsistent 
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 This opposition message did not end in the halls of Congress, as the Federalist 
press also did what it could to stem the tide of pro-war messaging. The New York 
Evening Post glibly stated that “there is all the difference in the world between an army 
on paper, and an army in the field,”
32
 and later ran a story titled “They Call it a War for 
Commerce!”
33
 aimed at disseminating the message that, in fact, this war would damage 
American commerce, and backed it up with detailed import-export figures. Later in the 
year, the Post buttressed these arguments by imploring: “Citizens, if pecuniary redress is 
your object in going to war with England, the measure is perfect madness,” and also 
printing that “the desire to annex Canada to the United States is as base an ambition as 
ever burned in the bosom of Alexander”.
34
   
 The second oppositional category was a criticism of democracy itself. By this line 
of argument, the American people were being stirred to war by uncaring demagogues, 
largely the Democratic-Republicans of the South and West who did not share the 
refineries of the New England and New York Federalists. Even in the face of the 
empirical realities of the day, namely that trade would be hindered by a war and that 
success was far from certain, these War Hawks would gladly lead the nation down this 
path if only the nascent democratic ethos of America would let them.  
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 Most Federalist press in this vein assumed the characteristic of condescension 
towards democratic government in general, and the democratic public in particular. The 
Washington Federalist proclaimed that “We have never, on any occasion, witnessed the 
spirit of the people excited to so great a degree of indignation, or such a thirst for 
revenge,”
35
 and the Boston Gazette stated that “The spirit of our citizens is rising and may 
burst into a flame. Everything should therefore be done to calm them till the Legislature 
has had time to mature its plans of redress”.
36
 Perhaps the heaviest anti-democratic 
argument came from an expected source, the New York Evening Post, which wrote that: 
“The Jefferson party, in the very teeth of all their professions, yet sounding in our ears, 
refuse to restore intercourse with Great Britain, unless it is also restored with France. 
What language can convey the indignant emotions that every American must experience 
at this bare faced conduct? I am lost in amazement. How long will the people remain 





In Great Britain, as in the United States, the evidence reveals no mention of the 
need to negotiate with a perceived fellow democratic state. To be sure, opposition to the 
Orders in Council did arrive, but their opposition took much the same tact as that across 
the Atlantic. On nine occasions between February 18 and March 25, 1808, the House of 
Commons took up opposition to His Majesty’s measures, mostly aimed at the economic 
hardship that could come from punishing states like the United States whose trade was 
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highly beneficial to Great Britain.
38
 On one occasion, a group of MP’s led by Lords 
Granville and Grey went so far as to declare the Orders “wholly unjust and unnecessary, 
and in the highest degree injurious to the most important interests of the country”.
39
 
 Additionally, a group of London and Liverpool merchants, similar in character 
and political ideology to their New England counterparts, petitioned Parliament for action 
against the Orders and wrote that ceasing United States trade was likely to do more harm 
than good to Great Britain.
40
 As in Parliament, the British merchant class appears to have 
been more concerned with the benefits of economic interdependence than the democratic 
sameness of the United States. However, unlike their North American business partners, 
those who shared the pro-economic interdependence view in Parliament were not on the 
same messaging point. The House of Commons specifically scoffed at the idea that these 
Orders violated the law of nations, instead reverting to the realist logic that “the question 
of the conformity of these Orders to the law of nations, cannot be viewed in the 
abstract”.
41
 In other words, these were not so much democratic opponents of war as they 
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Was the Attempt at Securitization Successful? 
  
On June 4, 1812, the United States House of Representatives voted 79-49 to 
declare war on Great Britain. Two weeks later, on June 17, the Senate voted 19-13 to do 
the same. The United States was at war – for a second time in thirty years – with Great 
Britain. But was the threat from Great Britain securitized, or was this simply a matter of 
war being necessitated by events? 
 Let’s explore the process of securitization in turns. First, was the in-group/out-
group message received by the public? There is very little historical debate to the fact the 
message of opposition was received and deliberated upon by the public. From New 
England to New York (Strum, 1980) to South Carolina (Latimer, 1956) to Georgia 
(Talmadge, 1953), the United States participated in the debates over the War of 1812 like 
very few issues that had come before. In other words, in the years 1803-1812, the United 
States engaged in an all-encompassing “cool and serious reflection,” to use Cress’ words, 
over whether or not to go to war with Britain (Cress, 1987). 
 But, moving to the second question with an eye to the first, did an opposition arise 
that discussed an in-group/out-group dynamic? In other words, did the Federalist 
opponents of war attempt to incorporate the United States and Great Britain into a shared 
democratic group as an argument against war, in order to counter the out-group argument 
of the Democratic-Republicans? The answer appears to be that they did not. At no point 




effort was spent by the Federalist Party deriding the democratic leanings of the United 
States. So much so that, in fact, a separate research question could be opened up in this 
case over how the poor perception of domestic democracy impacted the drive to war. 
 Third, did the opposition exert influence over the leadership of state and weaken 
the move towards securitization? Again, my research shows that this should be answered 
in the negative, but with a small caveat. The Congressional debate, particularly in the 
Senate, was distinguished by the fact that it was the first true anti-war democratic protest, 
and it certainly eroded the overwhelming majorities for war that one might have expected 
from the 1810 Congressional elections (Risjord, 1961; Johnson, 1969); but, again, very 
little if any of the opposition was based on the perception of Britain as a fellow 
democracy. Most of it was based on the narrow interests of a handful of Eastern 
merchants, an argument quickly rebutted by Calhoun who offered this immediately 
preceding his call to arms over the idea of a universal right to the seas: 
“I would not be willing, that the good of the States, the good of the people, the 
agriculturists and mechanics, should be put at hazard to gratify the avarice and cupidity 
of a small class of men, who in fact may be called citizens of the world, attached to no 




Giving the Federalist opposition the benefit of the doubt, however, one might still 
find evidence of successful opposition to securitization in the 1812 elections. Would the 
American voting public, small as they may have been in 1812, accept the message of the 




the public image of the administration” ahead of the elections (Johnson, 1969: 151), the 
Democratic-Republicans gained seats in the Thirteenth Congress, and President Madison 
was re-elected. In sum, the Federalist opposition message, or lack thereof, was not 
accepted by the public, and securitization occurred. 
 In the case of Great Britain, war was not sought, but when it fell upon them the 
public rallied in “preservation of His Majesty’s dominions” (Jones, 1958: 485). Goulburn 
wrote specifically about the high esteem in which the “British public” held the Navy, and 
that there support for the conflict stemmed largely forthwith (Jones, 1958: 485). 
However, it is worth re-noting here that the opposition from Parliament was successful in 
overturning the Orders in Council that had created much of the strife, albeit too late to 
impact the debate in the United States. In this way, Britain’s opposition was at least 
mildly successful in winning the hearts and minds of the British people. Nevertheless, the 
British governmental system of the time, which earned the state a -2 on the Polity 
composite score, calls in to question the empirical reality of British democracy, as was 
demonstrated by the lack of Parliamentary power to have debated the Orders in Council 
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In contrast to the escalated conflict arising from tensions in the early nineteenth 
century, a quarter century later a similar conflict point was resolved without escalation. 
Following the War of 1812 and the Treaty of Ghent in 1815
43
, Anglo-American relations 
reached agreement on the outstanding issues that had led to conflict, at least ostensibly. 
While impressment was put to rest, boundary disputes over the Northeastern boundary 
between the United States and Canada, which was still colonial British territory, 
threatened to inflame relations again during the 1830’s. 
 Two zones of conflict will be analyzed here. The first occurred in Upstate New 
York in December 1837. Shortly following the outbreak of a Canadian rebellion against 
British rule, United States citizens massed in the Buffalo region began giving aid and 
material support to Canadian rebels, some of which had taken shelter on Navy Island 
between Buffalo and Ontario. One form of aid came by way of steamboats, and one in 
particular, the SS Caroline, set off an international incident. As Ledbetter describes, “On 
December 29 (1837)…a small British fleet captured the Caroline, burned it, and then 
dispatched the smoldering hulk to the bottom of the Niagara River” (Ledbetter, 2009: 
239). The destruction of the ship left one British citizen dead. 






 The second area of friction occurred in the Aroostook Region in the northern 
recesses of the State of Maine, who had been engaged in an ongoing border dispute with 
Great Britain over the New Brunswick region since the Treaty of Paris in 1783 (Jones, 
1975: 519). In 1837, the State Legislature ordered a census to be taken of the territory in 
order to more fully leverage federal dollars, but in defiance of this overt claim to 
territorial possession, the British colonial government of New Brunswick (disputably in 
Canada) had the census taker arrested and imprisoned, a move many Mainers considered 
an “outrage” (Jones, 1975: 520). 
 While both incidents were eventually settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 
1842, for the purposes of this research they each experienced two critical turning points. 
The first for each was the outbreak of conflict, as the sinking of the Caroline and the 
arrest of the Maine census taker both received swift political attention in both nations. 
The second points, however, proved to be far more ominous for the prospects of war. Just 
as the Caroline incident seemed to be subsiding, New York arrested a Canadian-born 
British subject named Alexander McLeod, “and charged him with the murder of the 
American citizen who had died when the Caroline was taken” (Currie, 2005: 56). This 
incident, which occurred in 1840, set off a new round of Anglo-American disputes that 
revolved around the creation and interpretation of early international law. 
 During the Aroostook Affair, the second critical point occurred in 1839, when a 
firebrand Democratic Congressman, John Fairfield, assumed the Governorship of Maine 




1975: 523-4). This move was in contradiction of United States federal law, and brought 
the two nations as close to war as they had been since 1815. Both the McLeod and 




Following the destruction of the Caroline in late 1837, the response from the 
British Minister to the United States, Henry Fox, was rather immediate and decisive. The 
position of the British Whig government, led by Prime Minister William Lamb, Lord 
Melbourne, was that the sinking of the Caroline was a “legitimate act of self-defense” 
and therefore justified (Currie, 2005: 56)
44
. Following the arrest of McLeod three years 
later, and shortly before being replaced as Foreign Minister, Fox’s tone did not change. In 
a letter from Fox to United States Secretary of State John Forsyth published in the 
Harford Times, Minister Fox stated that the Caroline was “engaged in piratical war” 
when she was sunk by “her Majesty’s people”.
45
 
 In regards to the Aroostook Affair, the British government appears to have been 
primarily interested in the defense of the Canadian colony from American meddling, 
another example of realist logic and lack of democratic trust. This fear was not 
unfounded when considering the history of attempted and planned American incursions 
into this territory dating to the War of Independence. In a 1 January 1839 letter from 
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Charles Grant, Lord Glenelg, to New Brunswick
46
 Lieutenant Governor Sir John Harvey, 
Grant ordered him to “take steps for breaking up and rendering impassable so much of 
the road between the Penobscot and the Restook as lies within the Boundary claimed by 
Great Britain” (Le Duc, 1947: 32-3).
47
  
 Posturing in the United States took on a far more jingoistic form. Henry Clay (W-
KY), now a Senator from Kentucky who was considering a second bid for the presidency 
in 1840
48
, traveled to New York to remind the voters of that area about his hardline stand 
against Great Britain during the 1812 crisis and his support for protective tariffs against 
British goods. These remarks, delivered in the Buffalo area, were not too thinly veiled at 
stoking anti-British sentiment on the eve of an election where New York’s votes would 
be critical (Heidler and Heidler, 2010: 302). And the Niles Weekly Register, in what 
could only be described as an over-dramatization of events, reported that the frontier 
between New York and Canada will soon “be a theatre toward which the attention of the 
whole world will be anxiously directed” (Harris, 1997: 33).
49
  
 Passions in Maine burned even brighter. Congressman John Fairfield (D-ME), 
who would later assume the Governor’s Chair in Maine and stoke emotions further, took 
to the floor of the House and denounced King William of the Netherlands, who had 
recently arbitrated the border dispute, as “hostile to liberal principles” and a tyrant over 
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his own people. He placed the monarch of the Netherlands in with Great Britain, stating 
that they formed a “band of conspirators against the rights of man”.
50
 
 The Maine press was no quieter. Democratic newspapers such as the Kennebec 
Journal and Portland Eastern Argus, which would have tended to favor conflict, cried for 
war, while the Whig press in Bangor and Portland, which would usually have been more 
pacific, decried the British actions as an affront on Maine’s sovereignty while demanding 
action. By the eve of the armed insurrection between Maine and New Brunswick, Harvey 
had communicated to now Governor Fairfield that he considered the actions of Maine to 
be an “act of hostility, which will be met by me, to the best of my ability”
51
 (Jones, 1975: 
524).  
 While the British press remained largely pacific, exceptions abounded after the 
escalation of events in Maine and the arrest of McLeod in 1840. Both the Leeds Mercury 
and Manchester Guardian, which opposed war with the United States, made known that 
a conviction of McLeod would almost assuredly lead to war (Bernstein, 1998: 728). And 
Lord Palmerston, reacting to this public outcry in 1841, stated that America had become a 
“Bully” that needed to be “firmly and perseveringly pressed” (Bernstein, 1998: 728). 
 The language of security in this instance again took on realist forms. In the United 
States, outrage was expressed over perceived slights of territorial sovereignty, not 
entirely unlike the impressment claims of 1803-1812; in Great Britain, the language took 
on the form of opposition to American encroachments into British colonial holdings.  
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Opposition to Securitization 
  
Unlike the case of 1812, however, opposition to securitization arose in both the 
United States and Great Britain. Both states had elements within their respective 
governments that attempted to securitize the other, but both were met with opposition to 
securitization from a wide subsection of their respective bodies politic.  
 In Great Britain, the Reform Act of 1832, which had been passed by a Whig 
government, greatly opened up the electoral process of the United Kingdom, and shifted 
politics largely into liberal hands. This ideological shift was clearly displayed over the 
public reaction to the Anglo-American crises of the 1830’s. Lord Palmerston, who was 
acting as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under the Whig government of Lord 
Melbourne, referred to the United States as bound to Great Britain “by the Bonds of 
Kindred”. Four years later, in 1839, he wrote that “commercial interests on both sides are 
so strong…that it would require a very extraordinary state of things to bring an actual 
war”. It was not until Robert Peel took over 10 Downing Street in 1841 that Palmerston 
began to harden his American stance, partly due to events but more likely due to his 
attempt at keeping his position after the Conservative Peel had taken over the head of 
government from Melbourne (Bernstein, 1998: 727-728). 
 What is worth noting is that Lord Palmerston’s views during his tenure as Foreign 
Secretary closely mirror those of the increasingly liberal press of Great Britain. The 
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language of democratic sameness with the United States was prevalent throughout the 
British press of this time period. The Leeds Mercury wrote regarding the Aroostook 
Affair that a war would be “monstrous and criminal infatuation,”
52
 and later expounded 
by stating: 
“to go to war ... about some leagues of howling wilderness... with our best customer, our 
blood relation, and our great ally in the advancement of civilization and Christianity 
through the world, would be folly so monstrous and a scandal so flagrant, as to render the 
age in which we live infamous”
53
 (Bernstein, 1998: 726) 
  
The Edinburgh Review wrote around the same time that Great Britain and the 
United States, “the mother and the child – to be the joint depositories of freedom and of 
faith”
54
 (Bernstein, 1998: 727). And even in the aftermath of the McLeod arrest, which 
had noticeably inflamed passions in both the press and the government, the Manchester 
Guardian declared that though action was required, war would be “exceedingly shocking 
to humanity, from the fact of its being carried on between kindred nations”.
55
 
 In the United States, opposition was also vociferous and bipartisan. Perhaps the 
most pronounced form came by the way of President Martin Van Buren, an Upstate New 
York Democrat who had risen to the pinnacle of American power as Vice President for 
Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of New Orleans. His political pedigree would 
have dictated war footing, but he opted for a different direction. In Ledbetter’s words, 
“Escalating rumors turned one dead from the incident (Caroline) into 20, then 30, as war 
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fever swept New York State and much of New England. The situation was spinning 
rapidly out of control. Some thought war with England was inevitable. Others thought 
here was a golden opportunity for Van Buren to salvage a second term by rallying the 
nation in the cause of freedom against the hated monarchical aggressor. Van Buren chose 
peace” (Ledbetter, 2009: 239-240). 
 Why this counterintuitive stance from the Van Buren White House? Research of 
his comments of the time period reveals that his viewing Great Britain as a fellow 
democratic state, similarly to the bipartisan British view of America, had something to do 
with it. In his First Annual Message to Congress, four weeks prior to the Caroline 
incident, Van Buren declared that “the general relations between Great Britain and the 
United States are of the most friendly character, and I am well satisfied of the sincere 
disposition of that Government to maintain them upon their present footing”.
56
 
 Following the incident and the increasing tensions in Maine, Van Buren chose a 
pacific path instead of conflict, mostly chiding his own citizens for their behavior. In his 
Second Message, Van Buren stated that “Information has been given to me, derived from 
official and other sources, that many citizens of the United States have associated 
together to make hostile incursions from our territory into Canada and to aid and abet 
insurrection there, in violation of the obligations and laws of the United States and in 
open disregard of their own duties as citizens,”
57
 but that: 
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The offer to negotiate a convention for the appointment of a joint commission of survey 
and exploration I am, however, assured will be met by Her Majesty's Government in a 
conciliatory and friendly spirit, and instructions to enable the British minister here to 
conclude such an arrangement will be transmitted to him without needless delay. It is 
hoped and expected that these instructions will be of a liberal character, and that this 
negotiation, if successful, will prove to be an important step toward the satisfactory and 
final adjustment of the controversy”.
58
 (Italics added) 
  
As the situation progressed, Van Buren maintained an even keel. In his Third 
Message, he stated that “There is every reason to believe that disturbances like those 
which lately agitated the neighboring British Provinces will not again prove the sources 
of border contentions or interpose obstacles to the continuance of that good 
understanding which it is the mutual interest of Great Britain and the United States to 
preserve and maintain”.
 59
 (Italics added). His actions backed up his words. Despite the 
aforementioned political benefit that he could have gleaned from action, Van Buren 
pressed and Congress supported Neutrality Acts on January 5 and March 10, 1838, and 
another was signed by his successor, John Tyler, on September 25, 1841.
60
 
 This position by Van Buren also received Whig support. Congressman Horace 
Everett (W-VT), addressed Congress at the height of the controversy on February 13, 
1841, and made multiple references to the “friendly relations” between the United States 
and Great Britain, his optimism and support of “ongoing diplomacy,” and his heralding 
of past “executive correspondence,” namely the Neutrality Acts.
61
 And in June, 1841, 
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Senator William Rives (W-VA), a prominent member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, had a heated exchange with Senator Thomas Hart Benton (D-MO), an old-
line Jacksonian Democrat, over the approach towards Great Britain. Invoking memories 
of the War of 1812 debate, Rives asked whether “gentleman have held the sailors and 
marines of the Leopard personally amenable to our laws, and avenged the national insult 
upon them? I presume not”. To this Benton colorfully replied that “I would have hanged 
every one of them”. Rives then responded: “The Senator from Missouri, we all know, 
loves a summary mode of proceeding; but would such an act have been recognized by 
civilized nations, and approved by the general sense of mankind?”
62
 (Italics added) 
 Even John Tyler, the Democrat-turned-Whig who had assumed the presidency 
upon the death of William Henry Harrison, struck a cordial tone in his First Annual 
Message to Congress even while reaffirming American rights: 
“Many of the States composing this Union had made appeals to the civilized world for its 
suppression long before the moral sense of other nations had become shocked by the 
iniquities of the traffic. Whether this Government should now enter into treaties 
containing mutual stipulations upon this subject is a question for its mature deliberation. 
Certain it is that if the right to detain American ships on the high seas can be justified on 
the plea of a necessity for such detention arising out of the existence of treaties between 
other nations, the same plea may, be extended and enlarged by the new stipulations of 
new treaties to which the United States may not be a party. This Government will not 
cease to urge upon that of Great Britain full and ample remuneration for all losses, 
whether arising from detention or otherwise, to which American citizens have heretofore 
been or may hereafter be subjected by the exercise of rights which this Government can 
not recognize as legitimate and proper. Nor will I indulge a doubt but that the sense of 
justice of Great Britain will constrain her to make retribution for any wrong or loss 
which any American citizen engaged in the prosecution of lawful commerce may have 
experienced at the hands of her cruisers or other public authorities”.
63
 (Italics added) 
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In addition to the executive and legislative opposition to securitization, Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster, who had been appointed to succeed John Forsyth following the 
defeat of President Van Buren, also spun a national propaganda machine aimed at 
opposing war with Great Britain. Utilizing newspapers from the Eastern Argus in Maine, 
to the Washington National Intelligencer, to the southern outlet of the Charleston 
Courier, Webster was able to demonstrate that anything short of negotiations would lead 
to a “calamitous war with Great Britain” (Current, 1947: 191).
64
 Webster was convinced 
that this was necessary because the securitization forces had sought to “inflame the public 
mind,”
65
 and that the public should seek a “liberal and satisfactory arrangement”
66
 instead 
of war (Current, 1947: 192-3). On both sides of the Atlantic, the forces of opposition to 
securitization found themselves far more fortified than had been the case twenty-five 
years earlier. 
 
Was the Attempt at Securitization Successful? 
  
On August 22, 1842 the United States ratified the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 
putting to rest the boundary issues between the two states. Two months later, on October 
5, Great Britain followed suit.
67
 Aside from the unfortunate circumstances of Amos 
Dufree, the sailor aboard the Caroline killed in the raid that landed Alexander McLeod 
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on trial for murder, not a single battlefield casualty occurred in the disputes.
68
 In light of 
these realities, was the threat securitized in either nation during this crisis? My research 
demonstrates that the threat was not securitized in either the United States or Great 
Britain. 
 First, in answering the question of whether the in-group/out-group message was 
received by the public, evidence exists that it was, although not universally interpreted by 
all parties in the same manner. The newspaper coverage of this event was wide-ranging 
in both the United States and Great Britain, stretching from Maine to South Carolina and 
over the Alleghenies in the former, and from Leeds and Manchester to London in the 
latter. Further, similar language was demonstrated by leaders on both sides of the aisle 
with the press that supported their political efforts. For example, there were as many 
Fairfield’s preaching the opinion of the Eastern Argus as there were Palmerston’s 
echoing the Leeds Mercury.  
 That being said, it was also clear that this in-group messaging, namely of a 
democratic oneness between Great Britain and the United States, was pronounced. While 
Webster, a long-standing war opponent who had also stood in opposition to the War of 
1812, was utilizing a network of partisan papers to squelch war fever, pro-war outlets 
were drumming up support for another Anglo-American conflict. Even on the eve of the 
Webster-Ashburton negotiations that would ultimately conclude the conflict, the 
Cincinnati Chronicle, a bastion of anti-British sentiment, stated that Webster should press 
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American claims to the “last extremity” (meaning war) at the negotiating table (Current, 
1947: 187).
69
 However, whether one counted themselves among those who saw the 
United States and Great Britain as “kindred bonds” or whether they saw the British as 
“monarchical oppressors,” what is clear is that the in-group/out-group messaging was 
received and debated. 
 Second, did opposition arise that discussed the in-group/out-group language of the 
controversy? The answer here appears to be in the affirmative. While some language was 
utilized on realist grounds, describing war with Great Britain or the United States as 
“calamitous” and in their mutual “commercial interests,” far more ink and words were 
used to describe the two sides as members of a shared cultural and political self. This was 
demonstrated most notably by Senator Rives, who during the debate over the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty ratification drew sharp contrasts between the recent events and those of 
1812, and then hailed the British Government as now “under the influence of the moral 
and enlightened code which now controls the intercourse of nations”.
70
Even reasonably 
hardliners took such a bent when trying to bring the other side to the negotiating table. 
Minister Fox, shortly before his dismissal by the Peel Government, wrote to Secretary 
Webster and asserted that “the United States could not mean to contravene ‘the universal 
practice of civilized nations’” (Currie, 2005: 56-7).
71
 And John Tyler, who often found 
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himself susceptible to pro-war forces due to his tortured partisan convictions, hailed the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty thus:  
“The question of peace or war between the United States and Great Britain is a question 
of the deepest interest, not only to themselves, but to the civilized world, since it is 
scarcely possible that a war could exist between them without endangering the peace of 
Christendom”.
72
 (Italics added) 
  
Third, did the opposition exert influence over the respective governments and, 
therefore, prevent securitization? The answer is once again appears to be affirmative. 
This is perhaps no where more apparent than in the elections that took place in the United 
States and Great Britain in 1840 and 1841, respectively. 
 In the United Stats, William Henry Harrison bested Henry Clay for the Whig 
nomination, and became the first Whig elected President of the United States after 
defeating Martin Van Buren. His election was dominated by economic conditions arising 
from the Panic of 1837, which doomed Van Buren (Formisano, 1993; Zboray and 
Zboray, 1997), but when foreign policy did arise he took the side of pacific relations with 
Great Britain. This was evident in the fact that Van Buren, though losing nationally, won 
the counties in Maine and New Hampshire most affected by the Aroostook Affair, even 
though he too had a pacific feeling towards Great Britain. 
 Ultimately, Harrison served a little over a month in office before his untimely 
death, but in that time he appointed Webster Secretary of State. His successor Tyler, who 




gave much leeway to Secretary Webster in his negotiations with Lord Ashburton over the 
boundary question. This position was backed by Whigs in Congress, who took control of 
the House and Senate for the first time. In short, the election of 1840 sent a cabal of 
forces to Washington bent on keeping the peace with Great Britain. 
 In Great Britain, the Conservative Robert Peel assumed the Premiership in 1841, 
and promptly made changes that aided peace as well. Peel passed over Henry Fox as 
negotiator with Webster, and instead gave the title to Lord Ashburton. This move was 
due to the fact that Fox was viewed by many as anti-American, and Peel sought peace 
with the United States through the introduction of a friendlier arbiter (Jones, 1953: 478). 
During the debate over ratification in Parliament, Palmerston, who had changed his tune 
largely due to the political affront he suffered by being relieved of his duties by Peel, 
declared Webster-Ashburton “Ashburton’s Capitulation”. However, the previous election 
had placed mostly pro-peace voices in Parliament, meaning Palmerston found himself 
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Analysis of Anglo-American Dyad 
  
The War of 1812 was a case of a securitized threat; the Northeastern Boundary 
Dispute was a case of failed securitization. The question this research requires of us is 
why? All five control variables are successfully controlled for in this case study, as are 
three potential independent variables: power imbalance, IGO membership, and the 
presence of a great power dyad. This leaves three potential independent variables with 
potential explanatory power: democratic perceptions, empirical democracy, and 
economic interdependence. 
 
H1: Shifting levels of economic interdependence led to the securitization of threat during 
the War of 1812, and the failure to securitize the threat in 1837. 
  
It is possible to explain the divergence in outcomes in these two situations by 
viewing the changing nature of trade that occurred between 1812 and 1837. For one, 
between 1793-1815, the United States and Great Britain maintained mutually reinforcing 
barriers to trade: in the United States, the “American System” of Alexander Hamilton and 
the Federalist Party provided tariff barriers to trade in direct opposition to the “British 
System” of free trade; in Great Britain, an ongoing war with Napoleonic France made 
their government hyper-sensitive to trade protections in the Caribbean. By 1837, some 




 To be sure, examples of this thought process can be found within the debates over 
the respective controversies. Calhoun specifically highlighted his willingness to fight in 
defense of free trade during the 1812 debates,
73
 and it was the capture of the Chesapeake, 
an American trading ship, that set the dispute in motion. Two and a half decades later, a 
far more positive spin was being put on the trading relations between the two nations. 
Senator Rives, in his comments regarding the ratification of Webster-Ashburton, 
highlighted the reciprocal interests between the two nations, including “commercial, 
moral, and political”. In Great Britain, Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Granville and 
stated that the “commercial interests on both sides are so strong,”
74
 and used that 
language to justify his anti-war stance (Bernstein, 1998: 728). George Bernstein describes 
the failed securitization effort in Britain in terms that included trading considerations 
when he wrote: “This policy of appeasing the United States was forced on Liberal 
governments because their middle-class constituency perceived a 'special relationship' 
between the two countries, based on blood, religion, liberal traditions, and trade” 
(Bernstein, 1998: 725). 
 While this seems a plausible explanation, albeit hindered by the difficulty in 
accurate trading data from this time period, there are some reasons to question its 
validity. Anglo-American trade in 1812 was certainly hindered by the war with France, 
but only so because of the embargo policy in the United States which prompted the 
Orders in Council. In other words, the United States government could just as easily have 
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removed the 1807 Embargo Act, and it is likely that trade could have flowed more easily 
on open waters. Further, the tariff rate between the United States and Great Britain was 
far lower in 1812 than it was in 1837, especially after a string of United States tariff bills 
that began in 1816 starting taking effect, culminating in the oppressive Tariff of 
Abominations in 1828 (Remini, 1958). While these rates were lowered in 1833 by a 
Clay-Calhoun compromise tariff (Heidler and Heidler, 2010: 302), it was not until the 
1846 Walker Tariff in the United States, and Corn Laws in Great Britain, that the two 
states began trading in earnest (James and Lake, 1989). As such, while trade relations 
may explain the differing outcomes to some extent, they appear to be an incomplete 
explanation. 
 
H2: The passage of the Reform Act of 1832, and the empirical advance of democracy in 
Great Britain, led to differing securitization outcomes in 1812 and 1837. 
  
 This case study provides one of the clearest cases of the democratic peace 
theories primary finding, namely that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one 
another (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 43). By this argument, Great Britain was still a 
monarchy-in-transition in 1812, but by 1837 they had become democratic, leading to 
differing outcomes in these two episodes between the United States and Great Britain. 
 On the surface this seems plausible. In 1811, Polity lists the United States as 
having received a 9 on their composite democratic scale (with the highest being 10), and 
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Great Britain having received a -2. In 1836, on the eve of the Caroline Affair, the scores 
were identical. Nevertheless, Great Britain had passed the Reform Law four years earlier, 
and was democratizing, as evidenced by the 3 received in 1837 and then again throughout 
the controversy. It is not only possible, but likely, that leaders in the United States began 
to see Great Britain as empirically possessing democratic characteristics.  
 Similarly, the British and Americans of 1812 who perceived the United States as 
too democratic – America’s “stone blind people”
75
 – had dissipated. The language of 
1837-1842 heralded the “liberal,” “civilized,” and “enlightened” Anglo-Saxon people on 
either side of the ocean, which could very well have been the result of improved 
democratic conditions in both nations, as the Reform Act took effect in the United 
Kingdom and the last vestiges of Federalism faded in the United States. 
 Two criticisms arise to this argument. First, the empirical democratization of 
these two states, particularly the United States, is greatly exaggerated by hindsight. Great 
Britain may be accurately described as democratizing slowly, but a state less than a 
decade into major reforms is bound to retain some level of negativity towards rampant 
democratization. This was evidenced in an 1841 letter from Palmerston to Lord Russell, 
in which he derided American leadership for bending to the whims of popular pressure: 
“The American Statesmen are the most profligate and corrupt that are I believe to be 
found in the world”.
76
 A century and a half before Levy detailed the idea that democratic 




Palmerston alluded to just such a phenomenon occurring in antebellum America. Further, 
debates over slavery had inflamed the American South since 1812 (Capers, 1948: 46), 
leading to deeper debates over the human rights and universal equality promised by 
democratic institutions, and even Webster, who stood at the crux of the discussion, 
lamented to a British financier in 1840 that American “locofocoism” – early populism – 
and British socialism had both been a poor recipe for their respective governments 
(Lower, 1939: 363). 
 Second, American leaders had already begun to recognize Great Britain as a 
member of the democratic Self prior to the passage and implementation of the Reform 
Law. President John Quincy Adams stated in 1826, in relation to the Maine Boundary 
Dispute, that “Our own dispositions and purposes toward Great Britain are all friendly 
and conciliatory; nor can we abandon but with strong reluctance the belief that they will 
ultimately meet a return, not of favors, which we neither ask nor desire, but of equal 
reciprocity and good will”.
77
 And even Andrew Jackson, who fought against the British 
in 1812 and who bore a permanent wound on his face from the boot of a British soldier 
received during the Revolution, made these remarks in 1829: 
“With Great Britain, alike distinguished in peace and war, we may look forward to years 
of peaceful, honorable, and elevated competition. Every thing in the condition and history 
of the two nations is calculated to inspire sentiments of mutual respect and to carry 
conviction to the minds of both that it is their policy to preserve the most cordial 
relations. Such are my own views, and it is not to be doubted that such are also the 
prevailing sentiments of our constituents. Although neither time nor opportunity has been 
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afforded for a full development of the policy which the present cabinet of Great Britain 
designs to pursue toward this country, I indulge the hope that it will be of a just and 
pacific character; and if this anticipation be realized we may look with confidence to a 
speedy and acceptable adjustment of our affairs. 
Under the convention for regulating the reference to arbitration of the disputed points of 
boundary under the 5th article of the treaty of Ghent, the proceedings have hitherto been 
conducted in that spirit of candor and liberality which ought ever to characterize the acts 
of sovereign States seeking to adjust by the most unexceptionable means important and 
delicate subjects of contention”.
78
 (Italics added) 
 In sum, while it may seem likely that mutual democratization played a chief 
explanatory role in the differing outcomes in this case study, a closer examination shows 
that other explanations are at play. 
 
H3: Shifting democratic perceptions explain the differing outcomes of securitization 
attempts in 1812 and 1837. 
  
Many explanations can be posited for what shifted the perception of Americans 
that Great Britain was democratic, and vice-versa, including trade and empirical 
democratization. Additionally, domestic politics may have been at play, as the 
Northeastern Boundary Dispute occurred during contentious elections in both nations. 
Further, it may have resulted from the United States citizenry feeling more comfortable 
with their domestic democratic leanings. Finally, it may have been as simple as the 
passing of the torch for two respective generations – the Founders in the United States 
and the veterans of the Napoleonic Wars in Great Britain – to a new crop of leaders, as 
Toynbee first suggested (Toynbee, 1946). While these reasons for a shift in perceptions 
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are fertile ground for future research, what my research displays is that democratic 
perceptions were critical in the differing outcomes within the Anglo-American dyad. 
 The events of 1812 and 1837 in this dyad present examples of most-similar 
systems design. In both instances territorial integrity was the primary stated concern of 
the language of security, in 1812 in the United States and in 1837 in both states; 
perceived British maritime abuse was a critical catalyst, in 1812 over the Chesapeake and 
in 1837 the Caroline; and Canada, and its place in the British Empire, was at center stage 
in both instances. A small number of variables could explain differing outcomes despite 
such similar situations. 
 The variable which shifted earliest and most noticeably, however, was the 
perception that each state held for the other’s democratic leanings. In the United States, 
language shifted from “tyrannized,” “enslaved,” “British poison,” “royal insolence,” 
“British subjects,” and “dishonorable negotiations,” in describing the British government 
in 1812, to “civilized,” “liberal,” and “enlightened” in 1837. This distinction was 
specifically highlighted by Senator Rives in his March, 1843 remarks looking back at the 
successful ratification of Webster-Ashburton, using language such as “wise and 
enlightened statesman of England,” “public councils of Great Britain,” and: “In the 
maintenance of peace and harmony between England and America, there are so many 






 It is just as striking that so many American diplomats and press outlets 
utilized these words in 1837, which added thickness to the identity of the United States as 
democratic, something that was equally lacking amongst Americans in 1812. 
 In Great Britain, the shift was equally pronounced. First a Whig government 
under Lord Melbourne, then a Conservative government under Robert Peel, supported 
and fostered peace with the United States, describing them as “kindred,” “blood 
relations,” “members of civilization and Christianity,” fellow “depositories of freedom 
and faith,” and even describing them as a “child to a mother”. These sentiments were 
echoed, if not originated by, the partisan press of Great Britain, largely emanating from 
the liberal middle class. This process stood in sharp contrast to Lord Goulburn’s 
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Does democratic perception serve as the causal variable of the differing outcomes 
in this case study? While future research into domestic politics and the self-identity of 
democratic citizens would be beneficial, the variables analyzed here indicate that it does 
serve such a purpose. All five control variables were successfully controlled for, leaving 
three independent variables as possible explanations: economic interdependence, 
empirical democracy, and democratic perceptions.  
As demonstrated, changing perceptions of a democratic other preceded empirical 
democratic reforms in Great Britain, and both disputes took place before a vast majority 
of either Britons or Americans could participate in democracy. Further, mutual trade 
between Britain and the United States was no more beneficial in 1812 than it was in 
1837. With these variables controlled, it appears that the perceptions of leaders such as 
Van Buren and Peel, and Ashburton and Webster, provided significant explanatory power 
























France and Germany were an enduring rivalry dyad from 1816-1955 (Thompson, 
2001: 570), a period marked by three large-scale conflicts, the Franco-Prussian War of 
1871 as well as two twentieth century global wars, and numerous additional conflictual 
points along the way. This chapter will examine two of these moments, the first being a 
case of escalated conflict that occurred between 1918-1925 in the disputed Rhineland and 
led to a French invasion of the Ruhr, and the second a case of non-escalated conflict 
occurring between 1949-1955, surrounding the debates over West German re-armament 
following the Second World War.  
Both cases presented here occurred following the conclusion of a global conflict 
in which France and Germany were oppositional combatants; both cases revolved around 
a dispute over German militarization; and both cases utilized the language of security 
regarding both national sovereignty and in-group/out-group classifications. After 
controlling for numerous variables, I will examine the possible explanatory variables for 
the differing outcomes of escalation in the two cases. 
 This chapter will proceed as follows. I will examine the events surrounding the 
securitization efforts preceding the conflicts of 1923 and 1955 in turn. Each case study 




First, I will briefly detail the context and background of each case. Second, I will 
examine the respective attempts at securitization by the leaders of both France and 
Germany in the lead-up to conflict. Third, I will discuss the opposition to securitization 
that occurred in both France and Germany in the lead-up to each conflict. Fourth, I will 
answer, in each case, whether the threat was successfully securitized by the elites and 
general public in either France and/or Germany. Fifth, I will examine the potential 
explanatory variables that could account for the differing outcomes in securitization 
between the cases. Sixth, I will briefly conclude the chapter by discussing the most likely 
explanatory variable.  
 
Franco-German Dyad Case One: Ruhr Crisis, 1918-1925 
 
Case Background  
  
At the conclusion of World War One, the Allied Powers negotiated a peace 
settlement with Germany that placed the latter in a near perpetual state of inferiority. 
France, uniquely wary of a resurgent German threat, pressed for clauses 254 and 256 of 
the Versailles Treaty
80
, demanding reparation payments from Germany for the infliction 
of financial stress on the Allies caused by the conflict (Layne, 1994: 33-34).  
 Layne places the reparations issue, and the failure of Germany to meet their 
reparation payments, as the “immediate cause of the Ruhr occupation” (Layne, 1994: 34), 
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but Articles 42-44 of the Versailles Treaty
81
 should not be overlooked in analysis. All 
three articles forbade German forces from creating fortifications or arming the mineral 
rich region on the Left Bank of the Rhine (known as the Rhineland or the Ruhr), and 
none provided much gray area for the Weimar German Government in regards to 
securing their Western border.  
 As early as April, 1920, mere months following the Peace of Versailles, the 
French government was considering an occupation of the Rhineland (Advocates of Peace 
Through Justice, 1920: 133), an area located on both banks of the Rhine River between 
Germany and France which had been disputed by French and Prussian/German forces 
since the seventeenth century.
82
 For the next three years, tensions between the two 
nations rose to a boiling point before a German default on reparations in late 1922 led the 
French Government of Raymond Poincaré to order French and Belgian troops into the 
Ruhr in January, 1923. This occupation, which was described by the German government 
as a “moral state of war,”
83
 lasted until evacuations were agreed upon by the Allies in 
early 1925, and finally carried out in January, 1926 (Foreign Affairs, 1927: 682).  
 Layne argues that this series of events can be explained simply by a 
“geopolitical competition” between Paris and Berlin (Layne, 1994: 34). My research 
shows, however, that this analysis is overly simplistic. The French occupation of the 
Rhineland in 1923 was both a case of an escalated conflict as well as a securitized threat. 




 See Walter Marsden, The Rhineland (1973) 
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In the case of the former, this case represents a clear deviation from the findings of 
democratic peace theory, in that both states were coded as democratic by Polity in 1922. 
In the case of the latter finding, however, research also indicates that although the threat 
was securitized, democratic perceptions make for a far less black-and-white canvas than 
the one Layne paints and, in so doing, demonstrates an explanation for the democratic 




On 5 April 1920, the French government issued a statement detailing the 
immediate need for military incursion into the Ruhr region. In it, they noted that the “sole 
object of these measures is to bring Germany a due respect of the (Versailles) treaty: they 
are exclusively of coercive and precautionary character” (Advocates of Peace Through 
Justice, 1920: 133). Spears and Morgan, as well as McCrum, point out that the French 
pushed for possession of the Rhineland during the negotiations at Versailles, and were 
rather disappointed in their inability to obtain the landmass (Spears and Morgan, 1925: 
119; McCrum, 1978: 623). In this way, successive French governments were merely 
awaiting the threat that would fit the mold of a multi-year securitization process. 
 Under the leadership of Prime Ministers Millerand, Leygues, and Briand, this 
effort at securitization took the form of communications between France and her former 
World War allies, and little more. In January, 1922, however, Poincaré was elevated to 




of anti-German sentiments. For starters, Poincaré was President of France during the 
outbreak of World War One, but his anti-German feelings ran even deeper than the 
obvious. 
 Poincaré spent much of his career working to place sole blame on Germany for 
the outbreak of the First World War, and consistently reminded his countrymen of 
previous slights against French sovereignty. He described the 1871 Franco-Prussian war 
as an act of violence that “France could not forget” where Germany “torn from her side a 
living piece of flesh (Alsace and Lorraine)” (Poincaré, 1925: 4), and was no more 
guarded in his opinion of France as the unitary democratic government on the European 
continent. He informed the French people that it is “their unenviable privilege to have as 
its eastern neighbor an immense and mysterious power whose political regime has 
nothing in common with other civilized nations, and of which the least one can say is that 
under the guise of advanced ideas it seeks to spread the most frightfully reactionary 
passions” (Italics added) (Poincaré, 1929: 522).  
  His government, not surprisingly, immediately began pressing for rapid and 
unimpeded reparation payments almost immediately upon his ascension to office in early 
1922. By November, a Reparations Committee was in Berlin, and on December 16, 
Poincaré addressed the French Chamber of Deputies with a simple message. Reporting 
on a meeting the occurred in Berlin between the Reparations Committee and German 








 Poincaré took care in this speech to explain to the French Deputies that he had 
been vigilant over Germany, and that Germany had been granted a moratorium since his 
assuming office in January, 1922. But, he reiterated, it was clear that reparations were not 
coming, and in light of this, “if Germany will not pay up, the Treaty of Versailles affords 
us a remedy,” namely the seizing by the “creditors of the Commonwealth…all the 
national wealth of Germany”.
85
 He concluded by asking the French Chamber to stand by 
his upcoming order to “lay hands upon German property where that property really is”
86
 
– namely, the Rhineland.  
 In addition to this overt statement of policy, the Poincaré Government was also 
busy behind the scenes increasing tensions with Germany. In October, 1922, the 
Manchester Guardian published reports of French involvement in German separatist 
movements taking place within the Rhineland (Reynolds, 1928: 201), and documents 
released much later displayed Poincaré’s wanton disregard for the institutional 
framework of German government. Despite statements to the contrary, Poincaré had 
virtually cut off all discussions with official German government channels as early as the 
summer of 1922, and instead was negotiating with individual industrialists in the Ruhr 
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(Trachtenberg, 1981: 705). In this way, conflict had already ensued well before the 
official announcement of French and Belgian troop movements on 10 January 1923.  
 Nevertheless, the securitization message had gone forward. Schumacher wrote in 
the summer of 1923 that “it was well known that the events in the Ruhr are due to certain 
shortages in the German deliveries” (Schumacher, 1923: 155) and Miller stated that 
“there was no doubt” that Germany was in voluntary default of their reparation 
agreements (Miller, 1924: 46). Even Poincaré himself, responding to British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon, wrote that Germany was in violation of her reparation pledges, 
and that “the Allies have never gotten anything from Germany, except when, together, 
they have threatened the use of force”.
87
 In short, the securitization message was crystal 
clear: Germany has defaulted on reparation payments; history shows that Germany will 
not act except by force; therefore, force is necessary.  
 Securitization in Germany, quite to the contrary of the situation in Paris, was far 
more organic. Chancellor Cuno’s government, through the Berlin Press, declared that 
Germany was “bound for oblivion, and nothing matters anymore,” and that the people of 
the Ruhr were ready to “go the limit in resisting France”.
88
 These overtures were, at the 
same time, predictable, soft, and wholly unnecessary. Wilhelm Marx, who would become 
Chancellor in late 1923, wrote that the degradation experienced in the Ruhr during this 
period needed to be seen to be believed, and detailed “the curtailment of personal 
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liberty,” the “enormous financial and commercial losses,” and the nearly daily disturbing 
behavior (rape) of “drunken soldiers” brought upon the population of the Rhineland 
(Marx, 1929: 199).  
The German government could do nothing to stop French occupation and the 
German public did not invite it; but once it came, attempted securitization came to the 
people through the press of the Weimar Republic. The German satirical magazine 
Simplicissimus ran a political cartoon in 1923 with Gutenberg standing before his printing 
press declaring “I never intended this,” as the press spat out deutschmarks at a rapid clip, 
an allusion to the German people that French reparations policy was creating the scourge 
of hyperinflation.
89
 Other press forms were far less comical. The Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung wrote that France should make no mistake that “German fury is not an 
apparition,” and the Frankfurter Zeitung decried the occupation as a French maneuver of 
“pure violence”. The same newspaper later declared Poincaré to be a modern day Louis 
XIV, who should be met with stiff resistance.
90
 The language of security was well 
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Opposition to Securitization 
  
Opposition towards French policy in the Ruhr was expressed both from within 
and from without the Republic. Unlike many past international conflicts, the Ruhr 
Occupation occurred within the specter of the newly formed League of Nations, an 
international organization that tellingly did not include Germany (although the French 
and Germans did share twenty-five international organization memberships in 1922). 
This meant that French action did not just require the approval of their population, but 
also to some extent the approval of the international community.  
 Although Belgium and, by a weird twist of international law Italy, shared in the 
occupation on the margins, the Rhineland movements were, for all intents and purposes, a 
French operation (Miller, 1924: 46). Tellingly, neither the British nor Americans chose to 
participate in the occupation. The United States withdrew its European forces altogether 
via Bremen (Reynolds, 1928: 203), and the British stonewalled the occupation in late 
1922. At the Conference of Prime Ministers, held in December, 1922 in London, the 
British and French were “quite unable to agree,” but “M. Poincaré made known his 
determination to proceed with the occupation of the Ruhr, whether or not Britain 
sanctioned it” (Roosevelt, 1925: 114).  
 The British and Americans were not silent in their opposition. The New York 
Evening Post ran a headline story titled “Is the Occupation of the Ruhr Legal?” in 




they struck German industry. The American Journal of International Law also ran a 1923 
article by Finch titled “The Legality of the Occupation of the Ruhr Valley” (Miller, 1924: 
46). In a similar vein, British officials invoked pleas to international law. Lord Curzon’s 
letter to Poincaré stated emphatically that “His Majesty’s government has never 
concealed their view that the Franco-Belgian action…was not a sanction authorized by 
the Treaty of Versailles itself,”
91
 and Lord Buckmaster stated in a speech to the House of 
Lords that he feared French occupation counterproductive, and stated that it would leave 
Germany “naked to the assaults of anarchy”.
92
 Finally, in August, 1923, the British 
Government published all of its correspondence with the French during the crisis for the 
express purpose of “arousing world opinion against France”.
93
 
 In an increasingly globalized world of media, these opposition stances began to 
filter inside the French Republic. After months of rallying-around-the-flag,
94
 Prime 
Minister Poincaré began to see his domestic position weaken. In May, 1923, he 
unexpectedly tendered his resignation to President Millerand, only to promptly revoke it, 
after being rebuffed in the Chamber of Deputies.
95
 This refutation occurred when he 
asked the Chamber to support his decision to try a French military official in the 
Rhineland for sedition after the official had allegedly colluded with Communists, and 
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took their refusal to do so as a “vote of no confidence”.
96
 This was a dramatic reversal, in 
that the Chamber had repeatedly greeted Poincaré with only standing ovations since the 
start of the crisis
97
, and the idea of securitizing Germany as a potential Communist 
insurgency was a common theme of the Poincaré Government since 1918 (Dorten, 1925: 
400). Although his policy was ultimately sustained, domestic opposition was beginning 
to crack the armor of Poincaré. 
 These political chinks were largely explainable due to the insufficiency of his 
Ruhr policy. Buckmaster made clear in his speech that occupation had not only failed to 
deliver reparations to France, but rather made it less likely that they would be received, as 
the occupation caused a significant inflationary spiral in Germany.
98
 Poincaré himself 
acknowledged this when, in a January 1929 interview with American press, he stated he 
knew that “Paralyzing the mining industry in the Ruhr may inflict hardships on France” 
(Roosevelt, 1925: 115). And in the heart of the conflict, in June 1923, Herman 
Schumacher, an academic at the University of Berlin, laid out in clear numeric terms that 
if the occupation would have been sustained over a long period of time, “reparation 
payments will be quite out of the question” (Schumacher, 1923: 162).  
Poincaré acknowledged this opposition in his upcoming election, as his tone 
shifted dramatically. By late 1923, he stated publicly that he was ready to consider “all 
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means of settlement that could possibly render payment more rapid and sure,”
99
 a fairly 
stiff delineation of his hardline policies just months earlier. And, in the clearest rebuff of 
his Ruhr policies inside France, Poincaré was voted out of office in 1924 and replaced by 
a pro-peace party of opposition, which included Aristide Briand in a succession of new 
Premieres. While Marks asserts that this loss had more to do with the economic crisis 
than with the Ruhr policy
100
, it is hard to separate the two. Further, Poincaré kicked off 
his 1924 campaign with a speech on the Ruhr
101
, and it is reasonably clear that the 
diplomatic crisis played a defining role in the election, whether overtly or not. 
The shift in German governance brought on by opposition was no less dramatic. 
Gustav Stresemann, a former political theorist at the University of Berlin, was elected 
Chancellor of Germany in 1923 on a pledge to ease tensions with France. He then 
became Foreign Minister under his successor, Wilhelm Marx, later the same year. Marx 
opened up a work on the Ruhr Crisis shortly after leaving office by quoting a Former 
German Minister, Walter Rathenau, who had proudly proclaimed “Peace! Peace! Peace!” 
at the Genoa Conference some years earlier (Marx, 1929: 198). This was a fitting 
summation of their tenure. 
Stresemann played a defining role in German opposition. Faced as Chancellor 
with the prospect of Communism or anarchy, brought about largely by the collapse of the 
German economy, Stresemann worked to save parliamentary democracy in Germany 
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(Wright, 1995: 112). He did this by reaching out to the same opponents of French policy 
that helped replace Poincaré in France. These included British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain (Wright, 1995: 109), French Prime Minister Aristide 
Briand, and US Budget Director Charles Dawes (Stresemann, 1924: 552).  
In the course of their negotiations, this group of leaders was able to effectively 
oppose French occupation through two routes. First, they crafted the Dawes Plan of 1924, 
which stabilized inflation in Germany through a United States agreement (Stresemann, 
1924: 555). Second, they signed the Locarno Treaty in 1925 with six participating 
nations, which ended the Ruhr Occupation and included a pledge from Germany and 
France to no longer settle border disputes by force.
102
 Dawes, Briand, and Stresemann 
were each awarded Nobel Peace Prizes in 1925 and 1926; Germany joined the League of 
Nations in 1926; and both France and Germany became signatories on the 1928 Kellogg-
Briand Pact, calling for the outlawing of all war. In his Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, 
Stresemann summed up the German opposition of this time period by stating that the 
problems facing the Weimar Republic required solutions that only a “new Germany” – a 
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Was the Attempt at Securitization Successful? 
  
 In this case, was the in-group/out-group message received by the public? While 
research indicates that the answer is in the affirmative, it also presents us with a unique 
case. Both nations had been mired in a war mere months before hostilities over the Ruhr 
commenced, with Roosevelt placing the date of first consideration the earliest: 
“beginning with the armistice” (Roosevelt, 1925: 112). In France, the in-group/out-group 
message was best defined by Poincaré, whose speech to the Chamber of Deputies 
detailed the idea that France belonged to a civilized group of nations, while Germany 
would not respond to requests except by force.
104
 In Germany, the same language was 
utilized. Chancellor Cuno compared Poincaré to past French imperialists, namely Louis 
XIV, and compared the Treaty of Versailles to the Peace of Westphalia in claiming that it 
would be used to achieve “the ruin of Germany”.
105
 Both populaces received a message 
of a modernizing Self and an obstinate Other.  
 Once that message was received, did an opposition arise that discussed a differing 
in-group/out-group dynamic? The affirmative answer to that question is far less cloudy. 
Both Poincaré and Cuno were turned out of office within eighteen months of the 
commencement of hostilities, and both were replaced by future Nobel Laureates who 
sought peace. Further, for one of the first times in world history, an international 
opposition helped alter domestic populations, demonstrating that a democratic exchange 
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of ideas could shape the behavior of fellow democracies, and in so doing, providing a 
strong case for normative democratic peace. 
 It is the research into the third question of securitization that makes the Rhineland 
a unique case. Did the opposition exert influence over the leadership of state and weaken 
the move towards securitization? On its face, it would seem that this could be answered 
in the affirmative as well; in fact, it would be rare to witness another case where both 
nations involved in conflict witnessed such swift and dramatic leadership changes over 
the issue of conflict. However, this conclusion would disregard the events that occurred 
immediately before the escalation of the Ruhr Crisis.  
 Layne astutely quotes Schmidt who describes these events as a practical renewal 
of war (Layne, 1994: 33), which shows that from 1919 until 1923 both publics were 
aware of the pending danger that crisis could set off. In light of this, the events of 1922 
are just as instructive as the events of 1923-4. As The Marquess of Lothian details, in 
1922 Aristide Briand, during an earlier stint as Prime Minister, worked with the British 
on a treaty that would have settled the affairs of Europe peacefully. In response, Poincaré 
took the position that peace was unlikely to occur, “threw M. Briand out of office,” 
dismissed the Genoa Conference of which Marx hailed, “and attempted to coerce 
Germany to do the impossible by invading the Ruhr” (Lothian, 1936: 47). This series of 
events would reflect a failed case of peaceful opposition forces securing control over the 




 On the flip side, the political events of 1923-4 take an almost fully contrary tact, 
with each side playing the reverse role. If this were considered to be the seminal moment 
in the process, research would then find that securitization did not occur in this case. In 
order to get at the heart of the research here, and bring some clarity to this question, it is 
worth noting the one variable that both of these cases have in common: the language of 
security did not include democracy. 
 The key events of 1923-4 all surrounded the failure of the Poincaré Government’s 
Ruhr policy to deliver the desired result – reparations – and the diplomatic isolation being 
caused by a France unwilling to work with the rest of the world. Even committed French 
liberals like Briand still harbored doubts about Germany, as illustrated by a stern 
exchange he had over reparations a single year before Poincaré took office (Lauzanne, 
1921: 28). The one exception in the equation was Stresemann, whose liberal tendencies 
appeared so strong that most realists with whom he negotiated were frustrated by what 
they perceived as his naiveté (Wright, 1995: 110), but even that was not enough on its 
own to avert escalation. In the final analysis, the events leading up to the escalation in the 
Ruhr lead me to classify this case as a successful securitization, while also conceding that 















I will now examine a second case within the Franco-German dyad: the 
deliberations surrounding the push for West German re-armament following the Second 
World War, which was resolved without conflict escalation. In 1923, rising National 
Socialist leader Adolf Hitler used the events in the Ruhr as a catalyst to lead the Munich 
Putsch, an ultimately unsuccessful action that nevertheless started in motion a chain of 
events that would lead to his assumption as Führer of the Third German Reich in 1934. In 
1940, Hitler’s forces invaded and occupied France as part of operations during the 
Second World War, and they were not fully defeated by Allied forces until May 1945.  
 Subsequent conferences and agreements struck by the Allies, including at Yalta 
and Potsdam, dictated harsh medicine for Germany, much as was the case in the 
aftermath of the First World War. Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, the nation was 
split into separate occupied zones, with eastern territory under the control of the Soviet 
Union and western territories in the hands of the United States, Great Britain, and French 
occupying forces. Additionally, reparations were meted out to the Soviet Union in the 
form of forced labor and industrial capacity subjection, and a harsh process of 
demilitarization and de-Nazification were instigated. By 1949, with the Cold War fully 
underway, Soviet controlled territories split from Western controlled zones formally, with 




forming the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In this way, post-World War Two 
sanctions exceeded their predecessor in that the German state, as the world knew it, 
ceased to exist.  
 Concurrent with the formal recognition of separate states, the question of re-
arming the FRG was placed before the Western Allies, most notably France. This 
situation carried enormous significance, in that West German re-armament would be 
accompanied by membership in the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and would also provide a significant departure from the anti-militarization and 
anti-integration policies of France in the post-World War One environment. Following 
the outbreak of a second global conflict, regional leaders were much more attuned to the 
importance of these debates. French President Charles de Gaulle stated his belief that the 
“destiny of Germany is truly the central problem of the universe,” (Grosser, 1963: 551) 
and no less dramatically, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared “German 
developments to be of great significance for developments in the whole of Europe and 
therefore in the whole world” (Adenauer, 1952: 156).  
 Despite this seeming agreement, the discussions that began in 1949 and ended 
with German re-armament in 1955 were anything but smooth. There was a significant 
French attempt at securitization of the FRG, an attempt whose end was to prevent re-
armament. This case study will explore that attempt and analyze what caused it to fail, 
ultimately demonstrating that democratic perceptions played a critical role in the different 






Attempts at securitizing threat in the post-World War Two environment had more 
to do with securitizing threats to nationalism than framing West Germany as a renewed 
threat to Western security. While viewing the FRG, and its centrist Chancellor Adenauer, 
in these terms was not non-existent, all attempts at securitization must be viewed in a 
broader light.  
 In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the Schuman 
Declaration, declaring in simple terms that “If peace is to have a chance there must first 
of all be a Europe,” and to form this Europe, “all French and German steel and coal 
production” shall be placed under a “higher authority” (McKesson, 1952: 19). In short, 
the Schuman Plan “promised a unity of European peoples” (Parker, 1952: 381). On 25 
June 1952, a six-nation delegation of Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
France and West Germany ratified the Declaration, formalizing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) (Menderhausen, 1953: 269). 
 As the Schuman Plan began to take root, new ideas for “Europeanization” came 
along with it, and debates over those proposals took on an international flavor. Among 
the most consequential was an American-backed proposal for France, West Germany, 
Italy, and the Benelux nations to form a common European Defense Community – or 




(Kunz, 1955). By its very nature, this pact called for the re-armament of the FRG, and 
significant opposition was raised to its enactment during the ratification process. 
 This opposition tended to fall into two categories. The first could be described as 
nationalist opposition, arising largely from a belief system in the sovereignty of national 
military forces. This view was neatly summarized by French Premier Pierre Mendes-
France, who although an eventual supporter of EDC ratification, shared some of his own 
early misgivings in that “it was impossible for a patriot to consent to the tearing apart of 
the nation”.
106
 De Gaulle dismissingly called the proposal a “kind of British-American 
protectorate”.
107
 To this class of opponents, the threat was in the systemic nature of 
military integration, not in the make-up of the parties involved. 
 The second category of opponents to military integration could be described as 
anti-West German re-armament, and my analysis here will focus on their attempts at 
securitization. Before proceeding, however, two points are of note. First, as was 
previously stated, the opposition of this group was with a different tone, yet remained 
part and parcel to the larger opposition forces that opposed German re-armament on 
nationalist grounds. Second, this case is unique in that no overt military violence was 
ever reasonably threatened upon West Germany by those in France wishing to securitize 
the threat. The result of successful West German securitization would have been a state 
commensurate with their post-World War inferior position in Central Europe, as well as 




in no way positive, a scenario did not exist whereby France would take any military 
action in the FRG. 
 The anti-German opponents looked upon even the newly created FRG with 
distrust. In 1952, shortly following the signing of the Bonn and Paris Agreements which 
set discussions of the EDC in motion, President de Gaulle stated that the treaties “Give 
Germany entire sovereignty and quality of rights without counterobligation. Nothing 
prevents it (Germany) from taking up again tomorrow all its ambitions of yesterday”.
108
 
This opposition materialized in January 1953, when Gaullists helped elect Radical 
Socialist and EDC opponent René Mayer to the Premiership by a comfortable margin.
109
 
That same day, Mayer dumped Robert Schuman from the French Cabinet in hopes of 
solidifying the anti-integration forces inside Paris.
110
 
 Mayer’s government did not last long, but he was replaced in 1954 by another 
Gaullist, Pierre Mendes-France. Mendes-France bucked de Gaulle in an attempt to gain 
passage of a compromise EDC plan, but his Premiership was mired in consistent political 
infighting over foreign policy, including West German re-armament.
111
 Later that year, 
De Gaulle was successful in getting his spokesman in the National Assembly, Jacques 
Soustelle, to deliver a blistering rebuke against the EDC in which he listed three reasons 
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that ratification should be opposed. The first was procedural in nature; the second was 
that “the controls on German rearmament are more imaginary than real”; the third was 
that “there is no assurance that German nationalists will not come to power after the 
disappearance of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer”.
112
 
 Even when victories were secured by Mendes-France, they were done so in a 
negative fashion. In October, 1954, shortly after surviving a confidence vote by a wide 
margin of 350-113 in the National Assembly, the press reported a lack of enthusiasm for 
his government over the West German plan. One parliamentarian was quoted as saying 
“We have done our duty, but you can’t expect us to enjoy it”.
113
 In February, 1955, 
Mendes-France was replaced by Edgar Faure, another Gaullist.
114
 
 In Germany, opposition to the EDC was expressed exclusively from a nationalist 
perspective. Kurt Schumacher, a member of the Social Democratic Party credited as the 
chief opponent of the Adenauer Government, derisively referred to the Chancellor as 
“Chancellor of the Allies,” and his fellow partisans in the press took to stating that “The 
Chancellor always gets everything…that others want, only a little bit earlier” (Grosser, 
1963: 556). Despite this line of attack, there was never any questioning in West Germany 
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Opposition to Securitization 
  
International opposition to French securitization of West Germany was both swift 
and forthright. On 2 March 1952, reports surfaced of a so-called “Stalin Note,” which 
was reportedly sent to Chancellor Adenauer. Western fears of Soviet encroachment into 
Europe were stoked by the idea that the Soviets may attempt to “conclude a peace treaty 
with Germany”
115
 that could place them in the sphere of the Warsaw Pact nations. These 
fears were somewhat relieved by Stalin’s death in 1953 and the end of the Korean 
Conflict in the same year, but United States pressure for FRG militarization did not 
change message. In early 1953, newly-elected United States President Dwight 
Eisenhower wrote Chancellor Adenauer and informed him that “the whole European 
defense system would totter if France and Germany – the key nations – refused to ratify 
(the EDC)”.
116
 Eighteen months later, after it became apparent that France would initially 
resist EDC ratification, Eisenhower (along with British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill), threatened to recognize West German re-armament anyway, stating that “This 




 In addition to American personnel, British governing authorities also opposed 
securitization on security grounds. Churchill stood by Eisenhower in his quest to play 
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hardball with de Gaulle over the EDC, and the Labor Party leader Clement Attlee, chief 
opponent of Churchill, was often more pronounced. In 1954, he addressed Parliament, 
stating that the EDC was killed “not by Western democratic people – it was the 
Communists and Gaullists (followers of national Gen. Charles de Gaulle) in France who 
destroyed it” (Italics added).
118
 In sum, opposition to the securitization of 
internationalism was pronounced strongly by France’s two most powerful allies. 
 Nevertheless, much of this opposition was from without. Within France, de 
Gaulle was successful in opposing the EDC largely because he convinced his people that 
it was in France’s best security interest to do so. His argument stemmed largely from the 
fact that he did not believe France to be strong enough to control a newly formed EDC, 




 Opposition towards the anti-German securitizers was far more broad-based within 
both France and Germany. As early as 1949, Robert Schuman was already laying out 
before the world the question at hand in this time period. In a speech to the United 
Nations, he stated that “The first President of the new Federal Republic has just been 
elected and the first Chancellor designated. The destiny of Germany is again conferred on 
the Germans themselves”. Continuing, he cautioned that “The rhythm of developments 
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that follow will depend on the results of this experiment (European integration)”.
120
 In a 
document published a few years later, Schuman placed “German nationalism, nourished 
by incessant but futile scoldings” at the heart of the bloodshed of two world wars, and 
hailed the election of Adenauer and his parliament, the Bundestag, in 1949 (Schuman, 
1953: 350-2).  
 These overtures were both sincere and directed at a purpose. Realist concerns 
over the growing Soviet threat provided the impetus for Western pressure, but if the FRG 
were to be allowed to rearm, it would be so only because French and German citizens 
could come to realize that they shared a democratic ethos. This time period marked what 
Fukuyama would later call the “end of history,”
121
 or more accurately, the beginning of 
the end of history, in that the world was beginning to see itself in terms of democratic 
versus non-democratic spheres. 
 But which side was West Germany viewed on? Schuman was not the only 
diplomat to view West Germany as being a burgeoning, if not already in tact, member of 
the democratic club. By June of 1950, American High Commissioner in West Germany 
John McCloy was communicating with Allies that by working with “political party 
leaders, trade unionists, churchmen, and young people,” West Germany would soon be 
democratic territory (Schwartz, 1986: 371). Further, this was cased as a primary 
ultimatum: if progress was made, German rearmament would be viewed as both 
“necessary and desirable” to the West (Schwartz, 1986: 372).  
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 Western newspapers wasted little time in making similar descriptions. The 
Youngstown Vindicator, quoting from the Foreign Affairs Desk of the Associated Press, 
described West Germany as the “barrier on the turnpike between the democratic West 
and Communist East,”
122
 and the Sydney Morning Herald, referred to Adenauer as “the 
Good German” who simply wanted to make West Germany a cooperator in Europe.
123
 
 Perhaps the largest spokesman for this opposition message, as well as the largest 
proponent of West German democratization, was Chancellor Adenauer. In 1952 he wrote 
that “Our Western culture is based upon the liberty of the individual and the rule of law 
in human society,” before going on to discuss at length the history of democracy on the 
European continent (Adenauer, 1952: 156). He then makes the case that “We regard this 
European (defense) community as the way of living which is in harmony with our great 
occidental traditions, a way which alone can bestow permanency upon democracy and 
preserve the peace and security of the European countries” (Adenauer, 1952: 159). 
 In a companion piece to Schuman’s 1953 trope, Adenauer opened up his work by 
pointing out the importance of the Bundestag being popularly elected in 1949, but again 
made the case that democracy required military power in order to stand (Adenauer, 1953: 
361-2). And in 1955, after the original EDC proposal had failed and a new compromise 
reached that allowed for re-armament, Adenauer thanked the British and Americans who 
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welcomed them into “fraternal cooperation with people to whom they feel bound by 
common interests and ideals” (Adenauer, 1955: 183).  
 Adenauer’s campaign for the world – particularly France - to see Germany in a 
democratic light was not limited to academic musings. In 1951, in response to a 
reporter’s question over German re-unification, Adenauer stated emphatically that it was 
desired, “but in no case at the price of freedom”.
124
 That same year, he pronounced 
enthusiastically that Germany “will prove herself a reliable and unflinching partner of the 
free nations”.
125
 And shortly after being re-elected, Adenauer did not claim a personal 
victory, but rather a “victory for democracy” in West Germany, a state still stung by 




Was the Attempt at Securitization Successful? 
  
Analysis of whether or not securitization occurred in 1949-1954 shows a clear 
case of failed securitization. Those in favor of branding West Germany as a threat 
attempted to do so along two lines: that a European Defense Community posed a 
significant risk to national sovereignty, and that West Germany could once again pose a 
threat to French national security if re-armament was permitted. While the former 
securitizers met with minimal success, the latter met nothing but abject failure. 
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 First, was the in-group/out-group message received by the public? The messages 
placed before the voters of France and Germany were identical: West Germany should 
not be allowed to re-arm because they could pose a threat to the future security of France 
and no European security community should be formed because it would pose a risk to 
national sovereignty. Though these debates encompassed numerous treaties
127
, they 
consistently displayed a dominant influence over French and FRG politics during this 
time period.   
 France endured twelve changes in the Premier’s office between the introduction 
of the Schuman Declaration and the decision to re-arm West Germany in 1955, most of 
which the result of de Gaulle’s influence over the discussions on West Germany. And in 
Germany, Adenauer’s fourteen years as Chancellor were defined by these debates. In 
other words, there is a reason that both de Gaulle and Adenauer put such dramatic flair on 
descriptions of this issue, because during these years, they were, to paraphrase de Gaulle, 
the central concern of their political universe. 
 Did an opposition then arise that discussed a differing in-group/out-group 
dynamic? Research suggests that this clearly occurred. Focusing briefly on the first 
securitization message, namely that an EDC posed a threat to national sovereignty, 
opposition came from the international community and an increased Anglo-American 
military presence on the continent made this influence decisive.
128
 But even within the 
impacted nations, concerns over this line of thinking were pronounced. In 1952, shortly 
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before the Bonn and Paris Agreements that led to the EDC, Adenauer affirmed to the 
Allies “You cannot leave us without protection” (Onslow, 1951: 453). New geopolitical 
realities seemed to require new thinking. 
 The second message received even deeper opposition. Adenauer was a 
consummate proponent of West German democratization, and he served as Chancellor of 
the FRG throughout the entirety of the 1950’s. In this way, he was an enemy inside the 
gates, posing opposition to the securitizers like Schumacher, who never fully took the 
reigns of power. And in France, although de Gaulle was successful in curtailing the EDC 
ratification, he did so on the grounds of national sovereignty. Neither he nor the 
succession of Premiers who allied with him displayed any sustained worries about West 
German democracy, save for the speech by Soustelle. But even that speech, which helped 
to topple the Mendes-France government, came after the National Assembly had given 
Mendes-France a large numerical vote of confidence
129
 and also after it became clear that 
German re-armament would inevitably occur (Schwartz, 1986: 372).
130
  
 Finally, did the opposition exert influence over the leadership of state and weaken 
the move towards securitization? In this case, the answer is once again appears to be in 
the affirmative. As has been previously stated, Schumacher’s Social Democratic Party 
never held the reigns of power in Germany during the entirety of the debates, meaning 
Adenauer’s Centrist Coalition was consistently exerting influence over the state.  
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 In France, a more traditional pattern emerges. De Gaulle held effective authority 
over France throughout the discussions, but his leadership was inconsistent on this 
matter, as he attempted to balance Western Allied concerns with French domestic 
politics. Further, a succession of Premieres and Presidents – namely Pierre Mendes-
France
131
 and René Coty
132
 – bucked de Gaulle’s leadership and worked closely with the 
United States and Britain to craft a German re-armament plan. In fact, de Gaulle’s 
leadership had so weakened by 1955 that Coty called on Christian Pineau, a left of center 
United States ally who led a “Franco-American friendship society” in the National 
Assembly to form a government. One of the critical issues listed for the shift was “West 
German rearmament,”
133
 a clear sign that French public opinion had turned towards 
reconciliation. 
 In his Declaration, Schuman declared that a united Europe would create a “fusion 
of interest” that would ultimately lead to the elimination of the “age-old enmity between 
France and Germany” (McKeeson, 1952: 19). By 1955, it appeared that the proponents of 
securitizing West Germany had failed to convince the citizens of the two nations, and the 
citizens of the world, that this course was dangerous. The fusion of interests between the 
two states had begun. 
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Analysis of Franco-German Dyad 
  
 The mid-twentieth century period reviewed in this dyad was marked by a shift 
from a multi-polar world order to the bi-polar world order of the Cold War. While the 
two case studies under review, particularly the re-armament crisis, do not provide 
probable cases of conflict and occurred within the confines of this shifting balance of 
power within Europe, they nevertheless saw significant friction points which are 
instructive for research into the democratic peace. 
Both cases under examination in the Franco-Germany dyad present examples of 
failed securitization and successful securitization, albeit in adverse order. In the first case, 
liberal orthodoxy regarding an international community allowed the Briand factions 
within France to oppose securitizing the threat over the Ruhr, whereas realist orthodoxy 
allowed the Poincaré Government to successfully securitize the threat years later. On the 
other hand, realist orthodoxy originally allowed de Gaulle and his allies to securitize a 
West German threat and defeat EDC ratification in 1954, but liberal orthodoxy over a 
shared European value set allowed de Gaulle’s detractors, working in conjunction with 
the Adenauer forces in Germany, to defeat securitization over German re-armament in 
1955.  
 The research indicates that two variables are potentially explanatory for these 




perceptions. All five control variables and the remaining independent variables were 
successfully controlled. 
 
H1: The fact that both France and Germany were great powers in 1923, but only France 
in 1955, accounts for the differing outcomes over the Ruhr and German re-armament. 
  
As defined by Russett and O’Neal, the Franco-German dyad of 1923 consisted of 
two great powers, whereas the Franco-FRG dyad of 1955 consisted of only France. This 
reality is far more telling when viewed within the surrounding circumstances of the time 
periods. In 1923, Germany was part of a multi-polar international system of which she 
was a part; in 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany was a rebuilding player in an 
emerging bipolar system, caught in between the United States and her Western allies and 
the Soviet Union and her Eastern allies, most notably the DRG.  
 This logic would dictate that France was successful in securitizing the German 
threat in 1923 because their population felt it represented the greatest threat to French 
security. On the other hand, in 1955, neither France nor West Germany was able to 
securitize a threat from the other because they realized that each needed the other more 
than they did not, and joined forces to balance against a Soviet threat. This line of 
thinking was brought home by The Calgary Herald, who wrote shortly after re-armament 
that although the original EDC had set off “French apprehensions,” “the political and 
military situation has radically changed since then”. They were referring to the fact that 




the Soviet Union as an expansionist threat.
134
 Both common sense and a significant 
portion of this research would dictate that this variable did, in fact, have something to do 
with the differing outcomes. 
 To be sure, evidence seems to exist that indicates behavior commensurate with 
bandwagoning
135
 on the part of the West German Bundestag, particularly Chancellor 
Adenauer. In numerous works, Adenauer implores the West to accept the FRG into a 
security pact in order to save them, in part, from the Red Menace on their Eastern border 
(Adenauer, 1952; Adenauer, 1953; Adenauer, 1955). By this logic, the fact that Germany 
was no longer a great power had left the state vulnerable in 1954 and with only the option 
of joining the West. 
 Despite this evidence, two glaring deficiencies exist within for this explanation. 
First, the idea of communist aggression existed in 1923, and was in fact one of the 
primary tools used by Poincaré in his push to securitize the Ruhr.
136
 In fact, the difference 
between the “communist threat” of 1923 and the threat of 1955 would tend to tilt the 
balance towards a reversal of outcomes in these two cases. Great concern was given in 
Paris in 1923 to making sure that the Weimar Republic did not get overcome by domestic 
communists, yet no viable international organization existed to combat the eventuality if 
it so occurred. Compare that to 1955, where even without a Franco-German alliance, both 
the United Nations and NATO existed to stop a far more overt communist threat. One is 
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forced to ask why Poincaré, under those circumstances, would choose to further 
destabilize the domestic German government, while de Gaulle and his allies would 
choose the more difficult political path which also left France more vulnerable. It would 
appear that one might expect the opposite outcomes to occur. 
 Second, and more tellingly, great power calculations would dictate an 
extraordinarily different course for the Adenauer Government. Consider two possibilities. 
On one hand, Adenauer could have chosen to push for German re-unification and 
alliances with either the East or the West, or in a best case scenario, both. The “Stalin 
Note” considers just such a plan. On the other hand, Adenauer could have pursued a 
course of democratization and alliance with the West, fully understanding that his actions 
would earn him the enmity of the Soviet Union and East Germany, both of which 
occupied his borders, albeit through satellite states (Vigers, 1951: 153). Realist logic 
would dictate the former, yet Adenauer pursued the latter.  
 
H2: Differences in democratic perceptions of the Other resulted in differing outcomes 
over the Ruhr in 1923 and German re-armament in 1955. 
  
These two cases provide a unique situation by which to analyze the effect of 
democratic perceptions, in that they play out through such similar means. In the first case, 
a clear line of distinction can be seen between the negotiations that occurred between the 
anti-German French President Poincaré and the nationalist German President Cuno, and 
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those that occurred between President Briand of France and Minister Stresemann of 
Germany.  
Both Poincaré and Cuno were successful in securitizing the threat of the Other to 
their countrymen largely because they sold the in-group/out-group messaging so 
vociferously. In short, there was not a thing that Cuno could do that would make Poincaré 
see Germany as a democratic equal that could be trusted, and there was nothing that 
Poincaré could do that would make Cuno see France as anything but an aggressor. Briand 
and Stresemann, on the other hand, consistently perceived each other, and each other’s 
nations, as democratic equals.  
Turning to the latter case, there is a similar line of distinction between the 
dealings of de Gaulle and those of the Premiers who moved through French cabinets in 
1953-55. De Gaulle was a staunch French nationalist who, despite Adenauer’s outward 
pleadings and the empirical realities of the day, could not see Germany as a viable 
negotiating partner unless France consistently maintained the upper hand. This policy 
was reinforced by René Mayer, a Radical Socialist, but he was ousted in favor of Joseph 
Laniel, a Centrist, who was replaced by Pierre Mendes-France, a man who bucked de 
Gaulle on West German re-armament.
137
 Ultimately, Mendes-France’s policies were 
continued by a succession of Premiers leading up re-armament, but not before a Cabinet 
crisis had ensued largely over the issue of West Germany. French policy of the time 




democratic West Germany, ultimately leading them, under Premier Edgar Faure, to 





 This research suggests that the democratic perceptions that leaders hold of one 
another, and their ability to securitize that message with their respective publics, has a 
crucial impact on the escalation of conflict. It further suggests that these two cases, long 
regarded as pinnacles of realist thought, need further re-consideration.  
 When taken independently and considered alongside the global conflicts that 
surrounded them, they seem to be clear cases of power calculations. When taken together, 
however, it appears more likely that shared democratization and European identity were 
awaiting a positive perception, and that the Third Reich was an interregnum period of 
Franco-German relations. The conclusion of this case study is that the democratic 
perceptions that a Briand has of Germany, and a Stresemann and Adenauer have of 
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Chapter Four  




India and Pakistan have been engaged in an enduring rivalry dyad since the 
partition of the two states in 1947, and continue so at this time (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 
146; Thompson, 2001: 572). Their rivalry has been delineated by two distinct periods: the 
first occurring between 1947 and 1998, while both states were non-nuclear and went to 
war in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and the second occurring after 1998, when Pakistan joined 
India in the nuclear club. This chapter will examine two points of conflict which have 
occurred during the latter phase, the first being a case of escalated conflict that occurred 
in 1999 leading to the Kargil War in the disputed Kashmir Region, and the second a case 
of non-escalated conflict occurring in 2008, following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, 
India.  
Both cases presented here were the result of infringement upon Indian territorial 
sovereignty and both cases occurred while each state possessed the capability of a nuclear 
strike. After controlling for numerous variables, I will examine the possible explanatory 
variables for the differing outcomes of escalation in the two cases. 
 This chapter will proceed as follows. I will examine the events surrounding the 
securitization efforts preceding the conflicts of 1999 and 2008 in turn. Each case study 




First, I will briefly detail the context and background of each case. Second, I will 
examine the respective attempts at securitization by the leaders of both India and Pakistan 
in the lead-up to conflict. Third, I will discuss the opposition to securitization that 
occurred in both India and Pakistan in the lead-up to each conflict. Fourth, I will answer, 
in each case, whether the threat was successfully securitized by the elites and general 
public in either India and/or Pakistan. Fifth, I will examine the potential explanatory 
variables that could account for the differing outcomes in securitization between the 
cases. Sixth, I will briefly conclude the chapter by discussing the most likely explanatory 
variable.  
 
Indo-Pakistani Dyad Case One: Kargil Conflict, 1999 
 
Case Background  
  
In early May, 1999, Indian civilians inside the disputed Kashmir Region reported 
the presence of Pakistani military personnel within an area thought to be on the Indian 
side of the 1972 Line of Control (LoC). By late May, Indian military officials were 
reporting that 17 Indians had already been killed by Pakistani forces, along with an 
additional 90 injuries, and air strike operations were announced in the Kargil, Dras, and 
Batalik regions on 26 May 1999. It was the first time in twenty years that hostilities had 
boiled over into armed conflict between the two nations.
139
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 These developments were met by the international community with both surprise 
and fear. While the two states had long harbored mutual enmity, having fought armed 
conflicts in 1947, 1965, and 1971, guns had fallen silent in recent years. Further, the 
fruits of improved democratization in both nations had brought them closer together than 
at any previous time in their histories. On February 21, 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee, a member of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and Pakistani 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a member of the Islamic Pakistani Muslim League 
(PLMN), signed the Lahore Declaration in the Pakistani capital. This document pledged 
mutual cooperation and bipartisan negotiations to settle disputes between the two states, 
historically pledging that each nation would “protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” as well as each other’s sovereignty.
140
 This occasion led Prime Minister 
Vajpayee to declare that “there is nothing in our bilateral relations that can ever be 
resolved through violence,” and Bollywood actor Dev Anand, who was along for the trip, 
dramatically stated that “This is the greatest moment in the history of the world”.
141
 
 The developments at Lahore were encouraged by an international community 
anxious to see peace in the region due to developments a year earlier. Within three weeks 
of each other, India and Pakistan had carried out nuclear tests in May 1998. While India 
had developed nuclear weapons in 1974, Pakistan was a new member of the nuclear 
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armament club. These tests confirmed to the world that any Indo-Pakistani conflict could 
now become a nuclear exchange. 
 The agreement of Lahore, a nuclear umbrella deterrent, and dyadic democratic 
peace theory would have dictated peace in the spring of 1999. Nevertheless, conflict 
ensued. Tarzi hypothesized that the explanation for this can be found in the fact that 
Pakistan was a “poorly functioning” – or illiberal – democracy (Tarzi, 2007: 51). This 
chapter largely confirms those findings, but also concludes that securitization efforts on 
the part of India played a critical role, and that their actions would have dictated conflict 




 Farzana Shakoor, a Senior Research Officer at the Pakistan Institute of 
International Affairs, evaluated the aftermath of Lahore by stating bluntly “the past 
record of negotiations on Kashmir is not very impressive” (Shakoor, 1999: 50). This 
analysis certainly encapsulates an explanatory mechanism for the conflict in Kargil, 
namely that the two nations, though recently engaged in mutual democracy and 
negotiations, simply did not have a normative history of trust. This is clearly on display 
when examining each state’s attempted securitization of the other.  
  Within the Indian government, the language of security took on an almost 
immediate sense of realist necessity. Upon the commencement of Indian Air Force (IAF) 




stated that “Pakistan has been waging a proxy war against India for the past 10 years 
despite the Shimla Agreement. If they are doing it again despite the Lahore bus visit, it 
just shows that they have not changed a bit”.
142
 IAF Air Commodore S Bhojwami 
declared that “this action was forced on India,” and that had they not acted, “Pakistan 
would have been encouraged to extend its operation further”.
143
 Perhaps in the most 
jingoistic form of all, Union Minister LK Advani pledged to “smash” the Pakistani 
operation, which he described as a “totally new and disturbing dimension” to militancy in 
Jammu and Kashmir.
144
 In other words, India’s BJP Government attempted to securitize 
the threat by making a simple claim: Pakistan had breached their territorial sovereignty in 
Kashmir, and that sovereignty required defending. 
 Inside Pakistan the securitization efforts were far less concise. Ostensibly, the 
reasoning of the Sharif Government for movement into Kashmir dealt with a historical 
dispute over the boundaries of the LoC. This argument was put forward two weeks into 
the conflict escalation by Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, who argued that a more 
clearly delineated LoC would help ease tensions in the region.
145
 This issue was also 
raised between Sharif and United States President Bill Clinton when Sharif said that, in 
the view of his government, the Kashmir situation needed to be placed within a “larger 
issue” over the LoC if the tensions were to be resolved. This information, which was not 
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made public until five years after the conflict, was met derogatorily by President Clinton, 
who stated that it was akin to “nuclear blackmail”.
146
 
 While the issues over Kashmir and the LoC played a role, they appear to have 
become part of the dialog ex post facto. Therefore, Pakistani securitization efforts seemed 
to be of a more psychological nature. During the early days of the conflict, Pakistani 
Army spokesmen Brigadier Rashid Qureshi disseminated a disputed claim regarding 
Indian bombs in Pakistani territory, calling the situation “very, very serious”. He placed 
the blame of escalation squarely on Indian shoulders, and warned against the build-up of 
Indian troops and aircraft on the Kashmiri border.
147
 In essence, Pakistani securitization 
claims lie within a psychological escalatory spiral, whereby each reaction is more severe 
than the one which provoked it, and is exacerbated by psychological structural conditions 
taking place while the conflict is occurring.
148
 
 If this theory of securitization is true, and this research suggests that it is, Indian 
government officials faced a choice that could well have de-escalated the situation. On 
one hand, they could have built upon existing attempts at dialog, holding Vajpayee to his 
word that nothing in their bilateral relations could be resolved through conflict. On the 
other, they could press forward with a securitization claim that not only stressed realist 
concerns over sovereignty, but also exonerated India of the charge that it had made the 
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first moves in the escalatory spiral. Evidence suggests that the Indian government chose 
the latter course. 
 The Indian newspaper Merinews, in an analysis following the conflict, concluded 
that the media was used as a “weapon” by India to turn domestic and international 
opinion against Pakistan, and that these efforts were successful due to Kargil being the 
first “live war in South Asia”.
149
 The language of security employed in this campaign 
carried with it the implication that Pakistan was, at best, a troubled member of the 
democratic club who could not be trusted. India attempted to display to their public and 
the world that it was, in Tarzi’s words, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, 
who was in control of the civilian military of Pakistan and responsible for the incursion 
into Kargil, and that Sharif was simply along for the ride (Tarzi, 2007: 51).  
What Musharraf was not controlling, Indian securitizers argued, radical Islamists 
were. As early as May 25, 1999, The Statesman headlined a cover story “Pakistani Army 
Officers among Kargil Infiltrators”. Just two days later, The Hindustan Times could 
declare that “Intrusion Obviously Had Full Backing of Pak Government,” and two days 
following that, The Hindu headlined “Evidence of Pak Intruders on Indian Side”.
150
 The 
Indian press did not stop there. On May 26, 1999, the Indian Express asked “Is Osama 
bin Laden in Kargil?” These headlines continued unabated, as India made a concerted 
effort to cast itself as “responsible and trustworthy,” and its neighbor as “nonsecular and 
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 Three years following the conflict, The Hindu proclaimed that “India's 
encounter at Kargil was with the two-headed enemy, the militant in the rearguard and the 
Mujahedeen in the vanguard, actively abetted by the Pakistani GHQ that provided 
excellent, relentless, logistical and incessant artillery fire support bolstering the 
aggressive endeavor to redraw the Line of Control”.
152
 
 This line of thinking, which Merinews later reported was coordinated heavily with 
The Hindu, The Indian Express, BBC News, and CNN,
153
 was echoed by Prime Minister 
Vajpayee at a national address delivered on 7 June 1999. He stated to his people that: 
“Regulars of the Pakistan Army and infiltrators have been sent across. Fomenting 
insurgency here was heinous enough. But this time Army regulars have been sent. They 
have been sent to occupy our territory. And, having occupied it, to choke off our links 
with other parts of our country - in particular with Siachin and Ladakh. This step has 




 In sum, attempted securitization in India simultaneously took on the language of 
both realist concerns for the sovereignty of Kargil, as well as an attempt to securitize 
Pakistan as an unstable neighbor controlled by militants and radical Islamists, not by 
democratic institutions. In Pakistan, attempted securitization was cased in the language of 
self-defense, arguing from the beginning that India was responsible for the conflict 
escalation and only later discussing issues regarding the Line of Control and its 
boundaries. 
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Opposition to Securitization 
  
Opposition to securitization was robust in Pakistan while being nearly non-
existent in India. Judging on the empirical democratic ratings of the two states in 1998 – 
Pakistan (-6) and India (9)
155
 – this realization is ironic. Nevertheless, research suggests 
that it was the Indian public that rallied around their government, while a significant 
portion of the Pakistani political establishment did not do so. 
 With parliamentary elections bearing down in India, almost no opposition arose to 
securitizing the threat in Kargil. Shakoor accurately observed that “the BJP government 
exploited the situation to its full advantage knowing well that in an election-year an anti-
Pakistani policy would guarantee success” (Shakoor, 1999: 50). What little opposition 
was cast dealt more with the Vajpayee governments’ inability to see the threat looming in 
Kargil than with the actions taken since the bombing had ensued.
156
 For their part, India 
Today reported, without much evidence, the fact that “Pakistan is hell-bent on 
internationalizing Kashmir was apparent from the way they have rewritten the script in 
the new Indo-Pakistani drama unfolding,” while criticizing the Vajpayee government for 
appearing “a trifle delayed” in handling the threat.
157
 In other words, those who were 
opposed to the BJP policy were, at least publically, in opposition due to the government 
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not acting harsh enough towards Pakistan, not because they felt that the threat should not 
be securitized. 
 In Pakistan, on the other hand, opposition was rather significant for a nation being 
described by the Indian and world press as not being sufficiently democratic. The Dawn, 
a Pakistani newspaper, editorialized in July 1999 regarding the lack of cause for the 
ongoing conflict. They stated, “The people of Pakistan are not asking why Kashmir has 
not been liberated. All they are saying is that if this had to be the consequence of this 
adventure, what was the need to start it in the first place?”
158
 Far more critically, Benazir 
Bhutto, the former Pakistani Prime Minister and leader of the opposition Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP), penned a widely circulated opinion editorial to the New York Times 
on 8 June 1999. In it, she calls for a “Camp David for Kashmir,” and lists as one of her 
“principal regrets” that she put territorial issues in the region ahead of improved Indo-
Pakistani relations during his tenure as Premier. She highlighted with confidence that 
India and Pakistan could experience what Israel and Jordan had, namely the democratic 
principles of “genuine confidence…built with deliberate, incremental advances, which 
quickly triggered extraordinary and rapid progress”.
159
 
 This opposition was all the more noteworthy due to the fact that Bhutto had twice 
been in exile to military rule after her father, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 
had been hanged by a previous military regime. Her opposition was so widely publicized 
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throughout Pakistan and the world due to both her international celebrity and the sharp 
parallels being drawn between General Musharraf, who was pressuring the Sharif 
Government for firmer action in Kashmir, and Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the military 
leader who hung the elder Bhutto. As late as 2009, Musharraf, who never hid his support 
and operational control of the early stages of the Kargil incursion, was stating that the 
mission was a “success” in that it brought global attention to the Kashmiri dispute
160
, a 
statement not surprisingly in line with a prominent strain of Pakistani security language. 
 
 
Was the Attempt at Securitization Successful? 
 
 The opposition which did exist in India, which was both rare and quiet, 
evaporated completely in early June 1999. The BJP Government, in what The Indian 
Express declared was a “sound decision,” released tape recorded conversations between 
General Musharraf and Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz Khan.
161
 Under the 
jingoistic Express headline “A Rogue Army,” the tapes revealed a series of conversations 
taking place over the course of several weeks between Musharraf, Khan, and Foreign 
Minister Aziz which showed coordination with the highest levels of the Pakistani 
government, including Prime Minister Sharif.
162
 In short order, the Indian attempt at 
securitization was bolstered by recordings that neatly matched the securitization 
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narrative. As a result, Indian and Pakistani peace talks in New Delhi broke down on 13 
June, largely at the request of Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.
163
 
 This research indicates that the in-group/out-group message within India, namely 
that Pakistan was an unstable neighbor incapable of keeping control of its own 
government, was resoundingly received. Additionally, very little to no opposition arose to 
challenge this language of security, and that which did was effectively silenced with the 
release of the Musharraf-Khan conversations. Finally, the remnants of this opposition did 
not challenge for control of the state, as the BJP and Vajpayee swept the 1999 elections. 
Extolling the virtues of Indian democracy, Vajpayee called the wave of electoral success 
in the wake of the Kargil Conflict “The Mandate of ‘99”.
164
 
 The question of whether a threat was securitized within Pakistan is more complex, 
and requires attention to each phase of the process. First, was the in-group/out-group 
message received by the Pakistani public? It appears from this research that the message 
of India-as-aggressor was, in fact, received by a significant portion of the Pakistani 
domestic public. As Shafqat notes, both major political parties in Pakistan were 
“conspicuously silent during the crisis” – Bhutto’s individual opposition inside the PPP 
notwithstanding – while the “religious right exploited the crisis to mobilize public 
opinion” (Shafqat, 2009: 281). Just as Vajpayee’s BJP utilized the crisis for electoral 
gain, so too did the right-wing elements of Pakistani politics. 
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 Second, did opposition arise within Pakistan to challenge this language of 
security? The answer to this question also appears to be in the affirmative. Benazir 
Bhutto was the highest profile opponent of the Sharif policy inside Pakistan, but United 
States President Clinton probably provided more weight in shaping international and 
domestic opinion. In the early days of the “American unipolar moment,”
165
 Clinton broke 
ties with their historic ally Pakistan and aligned the United States squarely with India 
over Kashmir (Bisaria, 2009). This pressure was so pronounced after 4 July 1999, the 
date in which United States involvement formally commenced, that Musharraf cited it as 




 Third, did the opposition exert influence over the leadership of state and weaken 
the move towards securitization? The answer to this question appears, somewhat 
surprisingly, to be affirmative. On 12 July 1999, Sharif addressed the Pakistani nation on 
his decision to draw troops down in Kashmir. In a long oration, he derided those who 
allowed themselves to be “swept away by emotion,” “raised sentimental slogans,” and 
conspired to “obtain power and advance their political careers”. He then extolled his own 
virtue in the peace process, stating that “I did not follow the popular upsurge, if you 
recall. The results are there for everyone to see. If you have faith, you should only take 
those decisions which in your judgment are correct”.
167
 In essence, he displayed the 
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decision making and the language of someone who chose the opposition to securitization 
over the popular democratic pressures to increase tensions with India.  
 In the coming months, the fact that opponents of securitization had, indeed, taken 
control of the Sharif Government became increasingly clear. Just three days following 
Sharif’s address, retired Pakistani General Mirza Aslam Beg “lashed out” at Sharif for 
making the Pakistani military a “scapegoat” for the actions in Kargil, actions which were 
becoming widely seen as a debacle for Pakistan (Deshpande, 1999; Deshpande, 1999; 
Navlakha, 1999). Beg went on to blow the whistle on Sharif, claiming that he had 
authorized the incursion in January, one month prior to his meeting with Vajpayee in 
Lahore.
168
 Sharif never disputed this claim, demonstrating that his opinion on Kargil 
evolved along with domestic and global opinion. Nonetheless, one month following the 
cessation of hostilities, the Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamic fundamentalist party, held a 
30,000 person anti-United States rally in Lahore calling for Sharif’s resignation, and 




 On 12 October 1999, just days before Vajpayee was sworn-in in India, General 
Musharraf ousted Sharif in a military coup and took control of Pakistan. This move came 
almost immediately upon Sharif’s dismissal of Musharraf for his behavior in Kashmir, 
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and was reported as an obvious “blow to democracy”.
170
A month later, he was arrested 
for a host of questionable charges, convicted, tortured, and exiled to Saudi Arabia.
171
 
Upon his return to Pakistan in 2007, he promised a full probe into the “Kargil 
misadventure,”
172
 and went on primetime Indian television to apologize for the Kargil 




 In summary, this research suggests that the Kargil threat was securitized in India, 
but that its failure to be securitized in Pakistan following United States involvement in 
the crisis prevented further escalation. Nevertheless, it was India’s securitization of a 
perceived instability within Pakistani democracy that ultimately led to a conflict spiral, 
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I will now turn to the events surrounding the Mumbai Terror Attacks of 2008, a 
case which ultimately resulted in a non-escalated conflict between India and Pakistan. On 
26 November 2008, a coordinated terrorist attack struck the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, 
India, killing nearly two hundred Indians and wounding three times as many. This attack 
came on the heels of previous strikes (Ganguly, 2008), but stood apart for its acerbity. As 
the New York Times reported, “Even by the standards of terrorism in India, which has 




 Many similarities existed between the incursion into Kargil and the attacks in 
Mumbai. First, the Indian government instantaneously responded by assessing the attacks 
as, fundamentally, a violation of their sovereignty.
175
 Second, questions arose regarding 
the perpetrators of the attacks, as they were not readily identified as a member of a 
foreign military operation. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (INC), in a newspaper 
interview shortly following the attack, described the assailants as simply a group “based 
outside the country”.
176
 Third, Pakistan, through its President Asif Ali Zardari (PPP), 
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disavowed any government involvement with the attackers.
177
 Fourth, the 1999 
incursions took place in the midst of the Indian national elections of that year, while the 
2008 Mumbai attack occurred during the season of State Assembly elections. 
 Despite the similarities, two key differences existed between the events of 1999 
and those of 2008. First, Zardari and Singh represented leadership qualities that stressed 
democratic sameness over realist militarism. Singh was opposed to the more militant BJP 
factions within his nation, and Zardari was the husband of Benazir Bhutto, who was 
assassinated less than a year before the attacks by militants within Pakistan, as well as a 
member of the secular Pakistani People’s Party (PPP). Second, while the language of 
security emanated from outside the halls of government, within each government new 
dialogue took place in the aftermath of 26 November. Economic and Political Weekly, 
writing in December 2008, described this dynamic: “given that class-power elite's 
identification of "the terrorists" with the forces of darkness in Manichaean conflict with 
those of light (the self-appointed protectors of "democracy", "freedom", and "justice" on 
a global scale and all who are with them), the whole discourse invariably gets confined to 
ways of meeting the terrorist threat, which in practice boils down to "necessary" counter-
terrorism” (Economic and Political Weekly, 2008). This research largely confirms the 
analysis that what one views as “necessary” measures to root out terrorism – namely 
mutual democracy - best explains the differing outcomes of these two cases in conflict. 
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 Initially, the government of India presented a unified front to their citizenry, 
demonstrating a domestic want to both mourn the victims of Mumbai and also to not 




 Shortly thereafter, 
however, members of the BJP began accusing Singh and his government of weakness in 
the face of Pakistani terror. 
 The first criticism leveled at the Singh Government was directed at what the BJP 
perceived as a weak domestic political structure that allowed the attacks to occur in the 
first place. L.K. Advani, the Opposition leader in the Lok Sabha, came out as early as 29 
November in criticism of the inactions of the Indian government. He characterized the 
Singh Government as having a “non-serious approach” to terror, and described the 
actions of the militants as “full-scare war” on India. The Hindu reported that this was 
done largely for political purposes, stating that “the leadership (of the BJP) felt that it 
could not let go of the opportunity to electorally cash in on the episode”.
180
  
 The remarks for Advani were accompanied by word that he would not travel with 
Minister Singh to Mumbai, and also were accompanied by a BJP electoral advertisement 
that boldly stated: “Fight Terror, Vote BJP”.
181
 Within a week of the shift in policy, the 
BJP campaign appeared to be gaining steam. A shopkeeper who operated near the Taj 
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Mahal Hotel, and who was directly impacted by the attacks, commented to the press that 
“The system has failed. We all know that no government can prevent a well-orchestrated 
terrorist attack but our politicians have been irresponsible”.
182
 Attempting to further 
capitalize, the BJP redirected its language of security and directly pointed the finger at 
Pakistan. On 5 December, BJP officials communicated to Minister Singh that they would 
only offer support to the government if “effective steps were taken against Pakistan,” 
describing their border nation as having “diluted cooperation,” potentially giving nuclear 
materials to “non-state actors,” and “having no control” over jihadi terrorists.
183
 
 Pakistan displayed no such unity in the face of Indian accusations. Similarly to the 
case of 1999, members of the Pakistani Muslim League derided the Zardari Government 
for its decision to send Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha to 
India in order to assist in the investigation. The Dawn described the action as “incredible 
and unbelievable” in an opinion editorial
184
, and the various leaders of PML factions 
wasted little time in their criticism of Zardari for weakness. 
 PML-N spokesman Ahsan Iqbal described the cooperative actions of the Zardari 
Government as “hasty,” and asserted that previous Indian accusations against Pakistani 
terror involvement had proven false. He described the call from India for cooperation 
from the ISI as tantamount to a “summons”. Representatives from the PML-Q, a faction 
headed by the ousted military leader Pervez Musharraf, stated that sending the ISI was an 
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“admission of guilt”. Finally, former ISI General Asad Durrani ostensibly supported 
Zardari’s right to make the decision on behalf of Pakistani’s, but stated that he would not 
have personally done so. These efforts, like their Indian counterparts, had some 
semblance of success. News reported detailed radio and talk show callers in Pakistan 
claiming that India had received what she deserved in Mumbai, with one reportedly 




 In sum, the language of security on both sides of the South Asian divide in 2008 
took on a similar dialogue as 1999. Members of the Hindu BJP in India argued that their 
domestic institutions were too weak to adequately respond to terror, and further, that 
Pakistan was too unstable a neighbor to trust with controlling jihadists or possessing 
nuclear weapons.
186
 In Pakistan, members of the various Muslim League sects chided 
Zardari for bowing to Indian demands while also charging India with conspiring in an 
anti-Pakistani message that often proved false before the world community. In other 
words, both sets of securitizers viewed action as necessary because neither saw the other 
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Opposition to Securitization 
 
 In stark contrast to the Kargil Conflict, in 2008 the language of security was 
coming from opposition parties in India and Pakistan – the BJP and the Muslim League, 
respectively – and opposition to securitization from governing parties. Both Prime 
Minister Singh’s Congress Party and President Zardari’s Pakistani People’s Party adhered 
to principles of cooperation and mutual democracy, and both worked to oppose 
securitizing the threat that arose from the Mumbai terror. 
 The night following the 26 November attack, Minister Singh addressed the nation 
and promised a full response against those who perpetrated the crimes. In it, he stated that 
their neighbors (Pakistan) would not be allowed to use their territory for terrorist training, 
but even in a largely realist speech preaching security, he called on his nation to maintain 
the principles of “peace and harmony”.
187
 
 By 5 December, Congress Party members had effectively ruled out military 
options in response to Mumbai, and even went so far as defending their party’s stance of 
opposing crossing the LoC during the Kargil Conflict.
188
 On 11 December, Singh 
defended his party’s policies in these terms: “let not our commitment to civilized norms 
be misconstrued as a sign of weakness”. In the same speech, he placed the internal 
government debates within clear parameters, stating that “the idea of India as a 
functioning democracy and a pluralistic society is at stake”.
189
 Two days later, before an 
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international and domestic audience, Singh spoke extensively about democracy, and 
placed it in a regional context. He defined terrorism and extremism as a “threat to 
democracy and development” in the entire South Asian region.
190
 
 Further, the INC made it abundantly clear that any attempt by the BJP to 
securitize the Pakistani threat from Pakistan was a political stunt. Their spokesman, 
Manish Tewari, blasted the BJP, saying “I know they are desperate for votes, but I wish 
they had waited” to oppose the INC in their negotiations. Congress President Sonia 
Gandhi extolled the virtues of keeping the ISI Chief’s visit out of public site as a strong 
diplomatic move, stating that it “was not a publicity campaign,” and Senior Congress 
leader Veerappa Moily questioned the BJP’s patriotism, specifically citing Advani’s 
unwillingness to travel with Singh to the Mumbai terror site.
191
 In total, the INC was 
clear that it preferred a diplomatic solution to the terrorist attack in Mumbai, and was not 
afraid to confront the securitizers in the BJP on these terms. 
 In Pakistan, opposition to securitization came from inside the halls of government 
as well. President Zardari, uniquely qualified as the husband of the late democratic 
champion Benazir Bhutto, used his first address after being elected to the Pakistani 
presidency to highlight the quest for democracy. He opened his words with a salute to his 
late wife, and boasted his pride in “standing in front of the seat of democratic power in 
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 One week later, he addressed the United Nations and described the fight for 
democratic values as the chief quest of the times, stating that its development faces 
threats from both heavy-handed dictators and Islamic terrorists. He stated, in no uncertain 
terms, that “Democracy is not like a switch that can be turned on and off when it’s 
convenient. It is a universal value guaranteed to all men and women,” and called for his 
new government to work tirelessly to promote those values.
193
 
 Following the attacks, Zardari’s commitment was seemingly unshaken. After 
stating that his nation was not responsible for the attacks, he made numerous overtures to 
India, each extolling a brand of democratic oneness. Three days after the blast, his Prime 
Minister reached out to Singh and stated their shock and horror at the events, and 
expressed an interest that these occurrences not shake their united goals of eradicating 
“poverty, hunger and disease”.
194
 In the same vein, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah 
Mahmood Qureshi pledged his government’s support of aiding India in finding and 
prosecuting the terrorists, declaring that “Pakistan’s hands are clean”.
195
 
 Perhaps recalling the international, and particularly United States, response to the 
events in Kargil, Zardari also conducted a series of efforts directed at both his own 
population and that of the world. In early December he appeared on the Larry King Live 
show in the United States, and called the terrorists “stateless actors who are holding 
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hostage the whole world,” including Pakistan, who he reiterated had no say in the efforts. 
He assured the Pakistani people and the world that his government would proceed to 
gather proof against the jihadists, try them in open court, and sentence them for their 
actions
196
, promises which he ultimately followed through on after participating in a 
multinational process to bring them to justice.
197
  
 Days later, United States Secretary or State Condoleezza Rice and Joint Chiefs 
Chairman Mike Mullen visited with South Asian leaders in Lahore and urged restraint 
between the two nations, with Zardari in agreement.
198
 He gave an interview to CNN 
asking both sides – India and Pakistan – to “take a breath,” and said that the attacks in 
Mumbai were directed at both India and Pakistan as a threat to the free world, and that 
they directly challenged Pakistan’s “new democratic government and the peace process 
with India that we have initiated”.
199
 Most tellingly, in an op-ed written to the New York 
Times around this time, Zardari speaks positively about his neighbor, writing that “India 
is a mature nation and a stable democracy. Pakistanis appreciate India’s democratic 
contributions”. He once again spoke of the threat to democracy in both nations posed by 
the Mumbai attacks, and quoted his late wife in saying that “democracy is the best 
revenge against the abuses of dictatorship”. He closed with this observation: “In the 
current environment, reconciliation and rapprochement is the best revenge against the 
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dark forces that are trying to provoke a confrontation between Pakistan and India, and 




Was the Attempt at Securitization Successful? 
 
 In early January 2009, Indian officials turned over to Pakistan a dossier that 
included evidence of the guilt of numerous terrorists within Pakistan’s borders.
201
 
Pakistan cooperated with the information, and a joint operation ultimately succeeded in 
bringing the terrorists to justice. Arrests began in late January 2009, prompting 
immediate outcries from jihadist Imams within Pakistan
202
 as further attempts to 
securitize the threat continued. Military options were not considered further, if they had 
been previously at all. 
 It appears that neither the threat in India nor Pakistan was securitized. First, was 
the in-group/out-group message received by the respective publics?  Both nations were in 
periods rife with public interaction. In Pakistan, Zardari had assumed the presidency 
months before and following the era of Musharraf, leading many in the Pakistani public 
to tune in to the potential for democratic governance. This was demonstrated by the 
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reported interaction with radio and television sparked by the PML propaganda campaign 
deriding the Zardari Government.
203
  
 In India, an ongoing election cycle prompted the public to be hyper-aware of the 
in-group/out-group messaging being put forth, demonstrated not least of which by the 
nearly immediate shift in the BJP position on the attacks to a more militant posture. This 
decision appears to have been a direct result of political consideration, and was 
undoubtedly received by the public. Further, a report of the time showed that India’s 
media covered the attacks with an “engaged diversity” that allowed both political factions 
to bring their messages forward to the public (Muralidharan, 2008: 16). Finally, news 
reports detailed how the Mumbai terror attacks represented the first social media foreign 
policy tragedy of the region, prompting six million tweets and causing one commentator 
to describe Mumbai as a “social media experiment in action”.
204
 In short, the messages 
put forth by the competing political factions in each nation were received, perhaps by a 
wider array of citizens than at any time in history. 
 Second, did opposition arise within both nations to challenge this language of 
security? The answer to this question is not only affirmative, but both nations displayed a 
sizable level of opposition language. In Pakistan, Zardari and his PPP engaged in a full-
scale domestic and international media blitz which drove at one goal: making clear their 
stance that the terrorism in Mumbai was a terrorist attack on democracy in the entire 
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region. This campaign was so effectively administered that, in no less than a week, 
Indian, Pakistani, and United States government officials were lauding Pakistan’s 
cooperation in the process
205
, and by late January, military options were being taken off 
the table permanently.  
 For India’s part, Singh’s government also consistently opposed BJP efforts to 
securitize the threat of Pakistan. Even with electoral pressures, Singh’s Congress Party 
went so far as to challenge the patriotism of BJP members for their failure to rally around 
the government policy of peace
206
, and continued to treat Pakistan as a democratic ally 
throughout, as indicated by his repeated speeches in late November and early December 
2008. 
 Third, did the opposition exert influence over the leadership of state and weaken 
the move towards securitization? The answer is, once again, an affirmative. President 
Zardari mostly withstood the pressures from the PML to take on a more hostile stance 
towards India, and retains the Presidency of Pakistan to the present. The one exception to 
this was his ultimate recalling of his ISI Chief from India under popular pressure 
(Baruah, 2008-9: 197), but even this did not stop his government from assisting in the 
ultimate apprehension of the responsible terrorists. His administration has been marked 
with increasing democratic gestures, which now include the granting of “most-favored 
nation” trade status to India and a 2012 visit to the nation, the first by a Pakistani leader 
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since 2005. Ahead of the meeting, the Pakistani Foreign Minister commented that "it is 
the desire and commitment of both the governments to make it an uninterrupted and 
uninterruptable process," with the sentiments returned by Singh.
207
 
 Minister Singh still presides in India as well, and his opposition to securitization 
was also successful in capturing the democratic polity. In the 2008 State Assembly 
Elections, the INC was successful at defeating the BJP, which prompted a contemporary 
analyst to write that “the electorate has wisely not fallen for the BJP’s campaign that 
whipped up the issue of terrorist violence” (Economic and Political Weekly, 2008: 5). 
The following year, Singh’s INC also won the national elections. While Singh and his 
government engaged in some saber-rattling at the behest of opponents
208
, just as Zardari 
had, the opposition to securitization was clear and consistent, as well as ultimately 
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Analysis of Indo-Pakistani Dyad 
 
 During the 1999 Kargil Conflict, the threat of Pakistan in India, and vice-versa, 
was securitized; in 2008, the same threats were not. This dyad represents a close 
approximation of a most-similar systems case study, albeit with more potential variables 
then the previous dyads. It is worth noting that numerous variables require future research 
on this time period within the Indo-Pakistani dyad, including additional United States 
involvement in the post-11 September world, most notably in Afghanistan, and the want 
of the Indian government to foster democracy in the region. Nevertheless, the research 
conducted here is instructive on the role of democratic perception. In these cases, all 
control variables were successfully controlled, including nuclear weapons capability, and 
two additional independent variables – mutual IGO memberships and great power status 
– were also controlled for. 
 In ascertaining the cause of differing securitization outcomes, four independent 
variables remain: democratic perceptions, empirical democracy, power imbalance, and 
trade interdependence. Additionally, it is important to analyze domestic politics as a 
potential explanatory variable in this case, due to the diametric shift in governing powers 







H1: Differences in trade interdependence accounts for the differing outcomes in the 
Kargil Conflict and the Mumbai terrorist attacks. 
  
According to numerous scholars, trade balance is a key component in the 
maintenance of peace.
209
 By this logic, the fact that the two nations were less integrated 
in trade at one point, and not at the other, would dictate differing conflict outcomes. In 
this case, however, the conflict behavior of the two states represents an inverse 
relationship from what would be expected. In 1998, both nations were far more 
dependent on trade with the other than they were in 2007, and yet conflict escalated in 
1999 but not in 2008. Scholars of the liberal peace would argue the exact opposite. 
Further, at no point in the research did issues of trade become raised by political 
authorities or media outlets, giving significant doubt to the validity of this variable as 
explanatory. 
 
H2: Differences in power capabilities account for the differing outcomes in the Kargil 
Conflict and the Mumbai terrorist attacks. 
  
According to both Correlates of War data and military spending, India maintained 
a positive power imbalance in 1998, while both nations were largely balanced in 2007. 
This logic would dictate that successful securitization in 1999 resulted from the belief in 
India that military operations would be successful, whereas in 2008 the result would be a 




 While this logic carries some validity, and requires further research, the variable 
of nuclear capabilities cast serious doubt upon its explanatory power. At no point was a 
full-scale military option considered by either side, and the presence of nuclear 
capabilities by each side makes relative military power calculations largely obsolete. In 
late December 2008, The Hindustan Times hypothesized that “war between nuclear 
weapons states is out of the question”.
210
 While this presents itself as an explanation for 
failed securitization in 2008, it does not account for the fact that the same situation 
existed nine years previously, and yet securitization and war occurred. Cast in this light, 
power balance considerations were seemingly equal in 1999 and 2008. 
 
H3: Differences in empirical democracy account for the differing outcomes in the Kargil 
Conflict and the Mumbai terrorist attacks. 
  
According to Polity IV, in 1998 Pakistan was rated as -6 on a 21 point democracy 
scale, and as 2 in 2007. India, for her part, was rated as 9 in both 1998 and 2007. The 
argument for this variable as explanatory would be that in 1999 India was correct in 
assuming that they could not negotiate in good democratic faith with Pakistan, while in 
2008 that process was possible. Two significant questions arise to this line of argument. 
 First, the empirical rating of 2 on the Polity scale is far from a maximalist 
democracy. As demonstrated in the case of Great Britain in the nineteenth century, this 
score is highly subjective, and many of the same concerns were rattling Pakistani 
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democracy in 1999 as in 2008. However, for the sake of research, it is still important to 
take the empirical democratic scores of Pakistan as a possible explanatory variable. 
 Second, and with that said, a look inside the case study itself provides a clearer 
challenge to this argument. Within India, empirical democracy was the same in both 
cases, yet India securitized the threat in 1999 and not in 2008. Further, within Pakistan, 
the case study reveals a more fragile democracy in 2008 than in 1999. The Sharif 
Government had been in power for nearly two years when the Kargil Conflict began, and 
had the support of enough members of the Pakistani Muslim League in order to sign the 
Lahore Declaration in early 1999. The Zardari Government, on the other hand, had been 
in power for only months when the Mumbai Attacks occurred, and had been riddled with 
attacks, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, for over a year. Additionally, as a 
PPP government, the PML presented both a strong front in the streets of Pakistan and as 
an oppositional party. In short, the chances of the Zardari Government falling to domestic 
political securitization attempts appeared more likely to occur than the Sharif 
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H4: Differences in domestic government account for the differing outcomes in the Kargil 
Conflict and the Mumbai terrorist attacks. 
  
The most noticeable difference in the research design is that, when the two 
conflicts occurred, different political ideologies controlled the state. In 1999, India and 
Pakistan were controlled by religiously based political parties – Vajpayee of the BJP and 
Sharif of the PML, respectively – whereas in 2008, the two states were controlled by less 
conservative, democratic-secular parties – Singh of the INC and Zardari of the PPP, 
respectively. The logic of this variable as explanatory would argue that since both parties 
in power were less apt to securitize, securitization did not occur.  
 This explanatory variable makes practical sense, and would also require 
additional research to fully vet its explanatory power. However, the process of 
securitization itself demonstrates that it may be incomplete. In 1999, the BJP not only 
pushed the language of security over Pakistan, but was validated in Vajpayee’s “Mandate 
of ‘99”.
211
 Within Pakistan, Sharif’s Government attempted to oppose securitization, and 
was ultimately ousted in a coup. In both instances, the democratic public of India, and the 
military complex of Pakistan, could have reversed securitization, and ultimately conflict 
escalation, by pursuing the opposite course. Neither did so. 
 On the other hand, the exact opposite process played out in 2008. Both Zardari’s 
PPP and Singh’s INC faced significant pressure to securitize the threat. Yet both parties 




the face of potential internal coups and electoral defeat, and Singh surviving an electoral 
challenge which coincided precisely with the Mumbai Attack and its aftermath. In other 
words, while opposition to securitization emanating from inside the government bully-
pulpit may have influenced the differing outcomes, securitization ultimately took 
different routes at the hands of their respective democratic populations. 
 
H5: Differences in democratic perception account for the differing outcomes in the 
Kargil Conflict and the Mumbai terrorist attacks. 
  
Explaining the differing outcomes in this case study, as well as further explaining 
the differing domestic political situations, appears to lie strongly in the explanatory 
power of differing democratic perceptions. This case study reveals that this occurred on 
three fronts. First, within India, the Singh Government consistently repeated a core 
message of its role in a new democratic ethos. Utilizing terminology such as “norms of 
the civilized world” and “threats to democracy,” India appears to have been increasingly 
viewing itself in the realm of the democratic self. Further, they viewed Pakistan as a 
partner in this process, although a flawed partner, throughout the process of 2008. 
Vajpayee displayed no such language in 1999. 
 Second, within Pakistan, Zardari consistently and unabashedly attempted to place 
his nation within the context of a democratic state under attack from terrorists. This was 
done in both the domestic and international press, and made a partner out of the United 
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States, which was decidedly on the other side in 1999. Zardari viewed restraint – “both 
sides taking a breath”
212
 – as a sign of democratic restraint, whereas Sharif was quick and 
consistent to utilize the realist language of security in his public assessments. 
 Third, and most importantly, both publics displayed differing reactions to the two 
securitization attempts. In 1999, the Indian public consistently rallied-around-the-flag, 
displaying little to no opposition to the securitization attempts of the BJP Government, 
and in Pakistan, securitizers vehemently opposed the anti-securitization of the Sharif 
Administration, ultimately leading to his downfall. On the other hand, in 2008 both 
publics trusted the other as a democratic partner enough to rebuff securitization. It 
becomes abundantly clear throughout this case study that trust had developed between the 
two nations between 1999 and 2008, and that the overt use from both sides of democratic 









                                                                                                                                                 





 The Indo-Pakistani dyad reveals that, even under the nuclear umbrella, questions 
of securitization and perceptions of democratic self and other can lead to decreased 
conflict escalation, often in the face of overwhelming odds. India and Pakistan, like the 
previous dyadic case studies, had displayed an historic animosity that seemingly ruled 
peace out of the question. Their nations had fought wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and 
even after nuclear weapons were introduced in Pakistan, in the Kargil in 1999. In this 
way, their historical animosity may have been even deeper than the previous dyads 
reviewed here. 
 Nevertheless, in 2008, the two sides experienced a conflict pressure point and yet 
chose peace. While numerous explanatory variables have potential explanatory 
capabilities – trade dependence, power imbalance, empirical democracy, domestic 
politics, and democratic perceptions – it is somewhat clear from this research that the 
perception of a democratic self and other, and the role this status requires in international 
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Constructing the Democratic Peace 
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
 
What best explains the democratic peace: empirical indicators of democracy or 
the mutual perceptions of democracy within a dyadic relationship? The cases of enduring 
rivalry dyads researched here reveal a likely answer: a perception of democracy, not 
empirical democracy, is the best explanatory variable for the existence of a democratic 
peace. It is the belief in democratic oneness with a dyadic partner, perpetuated by elites 
and accepted by the public within a democratic sovereignty, which ultimately leads to 
peaceful relations even inside dyadic tandems riddled with enduring hostility.  
 In the Anglo-American dyad of the nineteenth century, three explanatory 
variables potentially accounted for the escalation of conflict in 1812 and the subsequent 
avoidance of such escalation in the latter portions of the 1830’s: economic 
interdependence, empirical democracy, and democratic perception. This research 
demonstrates that economic interdependence was no more valued in 1812 than in 1837, 
and even a cursory process-tracing of the time period between the two conflicts reveals a 
shifting perception of shared democratic self predating changes in empirical democracy 
inside the two states. On the contrary, the difference in executive and legislative 
leadership within both the United States and Great Britain, vis-à-vis the perception of 




 In the twentieth century, the Franco-German dyad offered only two competing 
variables for conflict in the Ruhr and the follow-on cessation of hostilities regarding West 
German re-armament in 1955. One, realist power considerations, proves remarkably 
capable in predictive power for the onset of tension, but would predict an opposite 
outcome for the alleviation of such in one instance and not in the other. The other, mutual 
democratic perceptions, particularly as they pertain to German leader Konrad Adenauer, 
demonstrated strong causal capabilities. 
 Finally, in our current century, the Indo-Pakistani dyad analysis revealed a host of 
potential causal variables to explain conflict escalation in the Kargil but not following 
Mumbai, including trade interdependence, power capabilities, empirical democracy, and 
democratic perceptions. While this dyad challenged the findings of democratic perception 
as a causal variable more strenuously than the other two, process-tracing of the time 
period revealed that democratic perceptions not only accounted for a peaceful outcome in 
2008, but the lack thereof may have accounted for both the escalated conflict of 1999 as 
well as the subsequent collapse of the democratic Pakistani government. 
 Process-tracing has allowed for this research to analyze “the dash,” in George and 
Bennett’s words (George and Bennett, 2005: 205-232), and in so doing helps to fill-in a 
long overlooked hole in democratic peace theory. By this it is to say that theoretical 
democratic peace rests on a simple covering law: State A displays empirical democracy, 




therefore, State A and State B will be at peace. This theoretical underpinning is highly 
incomplete, largely for two reasons. 
 First, peace is a contested concept, largely because peace is defined in the 
negative as the absence of war. The search for a “positive peace,” one for which many 
democratic peace theorists strive, is highly elusive (Adler, 1998: 166-168). As such, 
enduring rivalry dyads present a unique problem for the democratic peace, one which can 
not be easily overcome with a covering law. This often amounts to debate over the 
similarly contested concept of war, but need not do so. The process-tracing of the “dash” 
between points A and B in enduring rivalry conflicts allows us to garner a fuller 
comprehension of the historical, political, and cultural conditions of these hostilities, 
leading us closer to an understanding of a positive peace between rivals. This research 
demonstrates that democratic perceptions are a key component to that puzzle. 
 Second, oftentimes even with the loosest definitions of war and peace, democratic 
peace theory experiences exceptions to its covering rule. The War of 1812 between the 
United States and Great Britain, the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, and 
arguably the Ruhr Crisis between France and Germany, would all be included as 
exceptions, amongst others. This research provides an explanatory mechanism for these 
outcomes. In the same way that Walt made a progressive contribution to neorealist theory 
by postulating a “balance of threat” (Walt, 1987), the process-tracing of these enduring 
rivalry dyads provides a first step towards a progressive contribution to democratic peace 




 To further demonstrate these points, this concluding chapter will be presented as 
follows. First, I will discuss the impact of domestic democratic norms on the trajectory of 
the case studies under review. Second, I will discuss the prevailing realist challenge to 
democratic peace theory, and show that the case studies researched here reveal that a 
constructivist approach is often overlooked largely because of this parsimonious 
challenge. Third, I will use these case studies to demonstrate that new norms arose 
around the democratic peace that could add a layer to the prevailing normative dyadic 
theory. Fourth, I will explain the implications of this research on structural and monadic 
democratic peace theories. Fifth, I will conclude with a brief discussion on other potential 
cases impacted by this research, as well as suggested avenues for future research on a 
constructed democratic peace. 
 
 
Domestic Democratic Norms: Sen’s “Universal Value” 
  
Upon concluding the research of these dyadic conflicts, a pattern clearly 
materializes. What becomes quickly apparent is a chronological pattern of the power of 
democratic perceptions that neatly matches a geographical spread of domestic democratic 
norms. This pattern aligns with both Huntington’s hypothesis regarding waves of 
democracy (Huntington, 1991), as well as McFaul’s later postulation that a “Fourth 




 The first dyad under review existed in the Atlantic sphere, with conflict occurring 
during the time period detailed by Huntington as the “First Wave”; the second took place 
in the core of Europe, during the upheavals and subsequent governmental rebuilding 
years that occurred surrounding the antebellum and post-World War Two era 
(Huntington, 1991: 12). The third, that of India and Pakistan, occurred during the 1990’s, 
an era marked by Huntington as having seen democracies spread to all corners of the 
globe, excluding sub-Saharan Africa (Huntington, 1991: 14). The Indo-Pakistani dyad 
was also impacted by McFaul’s opinion that many newly emerging democracies, in this 
case Pakistan, may backslide and choose “authoritarian government” when faced with 
security threats (McFaul, 2002: 212). 
 Case studies reveal the importance of this pattern on research into democratic 
perceptions. All three case studies share at least one dyadic member struggling with 
perceptions of their own democracy at the point of conflict escalation, and both dyadic 
members embracing their role as a democratic state during the point of conflict 
resolution. Within the Anglo-American dyad, the United States’ largest opposition party 
to securitization in 1812 – the Federalists – were discounted in no small part because of 
their opposition to United States democracy itself, and many elites and citizens in Great 
Britain openly shunned democratic norms. Within the Franco-German dyad, both sides 
struggled with their individual democratic identities in 1923, with France viewing her 
position as that of an aggrieved security state and Germany wrestling within the confines 




democratic pressures applied upon the government of 1999, so much so that a military 
coup seized power mere months after conclusion of the conflict in Kargil. None of these 
self-perceptions existed in 1837, 1955, or 2008, respectively. 
 Further, Amartya Sen demonstrates how this lack of democratic perception at the 
state level can be just as damaging to a democratic peace as the lack of perception of a 
democratic other. He states that “universal consent is not required for a universal value,” 
but rather only that “the claim of a universal value is that people anywhere may have 
reason to see it as valuable” (Sen, 1999: 12). In this way, one can not expect either 
empirical democracy or the perceptions of a democratic other to display any impact on 
dyadic conflict before a body politic first perceives itself as democratic, and perceives 
that categorization as something to value, let alone the normative acceptance of peaceful 
conflict resolution that accompanies it. 
 It is pertinent that Sen’s work revolved around the case of India in 1999, a region 
of the world and a state under examination in this research. If, as Sen asserts, India was 
one of the last remaining “battlegrounds in the debate” over democratization as a 
“universal value”, it is not surprising that the acceptance of a democratic-self on the 
Indian subcontinent led to the peaceful resolution of conflict in the wake of the Mumbai 
terrorist attacks. This is even less surprising when viewed in the context of the dyadic 
case study, in that Pakistan greeted a new government under President Zardari in 2008 
that differed greatly from the administration of President Sharif in 1999, not least of 




democratic partner and Sharif’s fence-sitting with radical members of his own political 
party on the same topic. In sum, the recognition and analysis of this pattern of 
democratization shows us that the first piece to any constructivist explanation of a 




International Realist Norms: Points of Conflict 
  
A second pattern also emerges when viewing these case studies in totality, namely 
the existence of a strong realist explanatory variable for points of conflict within enduring 
rivalry dyads. All three demonstrate geographical considerations: in the case of the 
Anglo-American dyad the fight for control of Atlantic trading lanes, in the other two 
dyads direct geographic proximity. Additionally, each case presents a unique realist 
variable. The Anglo-American dyad experienced points of conflict over United States 
sovereignty, the Franco-German over the security of the French state in a hostile Europe, 
the Indo-Pakistani in the dispute over the territory in Kashmir. It is more than probable 
that this existence, coupled with the prevalence of realist theory in international relations, 
is what has led to the lack of attention to democratic perceptions: why seek out other 
explanatory variables when certain ones readily present themselves? 
 The first critique of this assertion is that not all conflict is equal. For one to assert 




which has proved elusive at best. The concept of “war” has been debated by scholars for 
decades (or longer), and no clarity has ever fully been brought to this subject (Singer and 
Small, 1972; Layne, 1994; Spiro, 1994; O’Neal and Russett, 2001; Rosato, 2003). 
Further, common sense demonstrates that there is a difference between the escalated 
conflicts of 1812, 1923, and 1999, and the de-escalated conflicts of 1837, 1955, and 
2008. This case study approach not only encourages that all conflict not be treated equal 
but demands it, and therefore provides a clearer explanatory picture to the traditional 
realist variables. 
 Second, the individual case study reviews largely disqualify realism as 
explanatory. In the first case, American sovereignty was far less impugned by the sinking 
of the Chesapeake in 1812 than by the existence of British troops on United States soil in 
Maine in 1837. In the Franco-German dyad, French security was not under threat in 
either conflict, as Germany was a vanquished former adversary in both 1923 and 1955. In 
the third case study, Pakistani militants were responsible for far less deaths in Kargil in 
1999 than they were in Mumbai in 2008, and denied official government responsibility in 
both cases. Yet, in each dyad, conflict escalated in the first case and was successfully 
resolved in the second.  
 Additionally, many of the control variables included in this research disqualified 
other realist considerations from explanatory power. In the case of the United States and 
Great Britain, neorealist balancing theory (Onuf, 2002: 220-1) would have dictated an 




American split in 1837 with control over the Western Hemisphere at stake. In fact, it is 
noteworthy that in this case those opposed to securitization in 1812 were calling for 
exactly that outcome, while the securitizers of 1837 were not quiet in their opposition to 
Great Britain as a hemispheric menace. Turning to the Franco-German dyad, 
Mearsheimer’s view of the formation of international institutions (Mearsheimer, 1995) 
would have dictated not only significant French opposition to West German re-armament 
in 1955, but also would have predicted a West German alliance with the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, West Germany became a democratic member of 
NATO, matching up far more closely with Ruggie’s prediction that alliances involving 
the United States would not fit European “balance of power logic” (Ruggie, 1995: 69). 
Finally, in the Indo-Pakistani dyad, Waltz’s theory of nuclear deterrence (Waltz, 2013) 
would have dictated peace in both 1999 and 2008, yet it only existed in the latter.  
 These conclusions demonstrate that a constructivist explanation is necessary for 
the differing outcomes of conflict securitization within these three dyads. To concede a 
point, this gap could very well be filled by Walt’s theory of “balance of threat” as 
opposed to empirical threat, nuclear deterrence, or balancing. But, on the flip side, this 
gap could also be filled by a theory of democratic perception. After a thorough review of 







New Norms: Rise of the Democratic Peace 
 
 Finally, a third pattern arises from the case studies encompassed by this research. 
In each case of successful conflict securitization, the securitizing state became engaged in 
consistent hostility with other, leading in part to the failure to securitize the following 
threat. This pattern goes great lengths in explaining how a theory of democratic 
perceptions can enhance the study of a normative democratic peace. 
 A quick overview of each successful case of securitization demonstrates this 
pattern. Following the War of 1812, Madison’s Democratic-Republican Party achieved 
unprecedented electoral success. Nevertheless, territorial disputes and trade wars 
continued to flare between the United States and Great Britain, leading ultimately to the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the election of John Quincy Adams, a former Federalist, in 
1824. After France’s incursion into the Ruhr in 1923, Poincaré was unsuccessful in 
holding his Presidential seat even past the 1924 election, being replaced by the pro-peace 
Aristide Briand. The following twenty years of Franco-German relations was nothing 
short of exhaustive in its scope of carnage, culminating in the tragedy of the Second 
World War. And, following the Kargil conflict of 1999, President Sharif was ousted in 
Pakistan in place of military dictator Pervez Musharraf, and Prime Minister Vajpayee, 
though securitizing the Pakistani threat during the 1999 election, lost his seat in 2004 to 




 The contrasting efforts at securitization – in 1837, 1955, and 2008, respectively – 
paint an even clearer picture. In each instance, democratic publics were treated with the 
language of democratic oneness with the other half of their respective enduring rivalry 
dyads, which stood in stark contrast to the successful securitizations of before. There is a 
marked difference between Clay’s “potion of British poison to bow the neck of royal 
insolence” and Van Buren’s “instructions of a liberal character”; between Poincaré’s 
description of Germany sharing “nothing in common with a civilized nation” and 
Schumann’s description of Germany as having its destiny “conferred on itself”; between 
Indian press descriptions of Pakistan as the “militant in the rearguard and the Mujahedeen 
in the vanguard” and Minister Singh’s commitment to “civilized norms” in the face of 
Mumbai.  
 This pattern is valuable for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the point put forth 
by Hayes that “shared democratic identity makes it very difficult for political leaders 
within democracies to successfully argue that another democracy poses an existential 
threat—a critical component to the securitization move” (Hayes, 2009: 4). In short, a 
democratic public must securitize the threat being put forth by elites, and in each one of 
the case studies reviewed here, they chose securitization in the first conflict, but not in the 
second. Further, democratic perception proved critical in the move towards securitization 
in all six conflict cases. This pattern both reinforces normative democratic peace, 




shows the overall importance of democratic perception on the dependent variable put 
forth by the democratic peace. 
 Second, it provides a third and final component to the constructivist view of the 
dyadic democratic peace. Onuf details that the peace and security of human society 
depends on three components: “security of possession, transference by consent, and the 
performance of promises”. In his words, “every society has the same start, and then each 
are allowed to follow its own path” (Onuf, 2002: 215). In each case, the states within the 
enduring rivalry dyad underwent an escalated conflict at the hands of successful 
securitizers. At the conclusion of each, the citizens of those societies recognized that the 
stability of their possessions, the transference of power by consent, and the performance 
of their governmental promises were impeded by conflict. Therefore, at the next 
attempted securitization, a different outcome ensued. In short, democratic normative 
values of peace began to set in. 
 In line with this, it is telling that war between the dyadic partners involved did not 
occur again following the last conflict studied here. The United States and Great Britain 
never came as close to war again as they did in 1837, now enjoying a long-standing 
alliance; France and Germany remain NATO allies, even following the reunification of 
Germany after the fall of the Soviet Union; India and Pakistan are closer now than at any 
point in their histories, having enacted trade agreements and cricket exchanges in the past 
five years. The processes at play in these case studies demonstrate that a new dyadic 




Sikkink, 1998: 891) - was taking hold. In this case, in order to achieve Onuf’s human 
society pillars, actors with a given identity (democracies) began conforming to a new 
standard of behavior (peaceful resolution of conflict), or to paraphrase Wendt, 
democracies began to make the most of anarchy (Wendt, 1992).  
 What these case studies further contribute to this hypothesis is the role of 
democratic perception. If liberal theorists are correct and empirical democracy is the 
causal variable behind peace (Doyle, 1983; Doyle, 1986; Doyle, 2005; Cox and Drury, 
2006; Henderson, 1999; Maoz and Russett, 1993; O’Neal and Russett, 2001), then these 
norms are unnecessary in that peace will take place from a systemic structural constraint, 
namely domestic institutions. But, as these case studies demonstrate, this did not occur in 
1812, 1923, or 1999, requiring us to further explore the creation of pacific dyadic 
relationships between democracies. This research demonstrates the explanatory capability 
of democratic perceptions, and once these perceptions are adopted, the idea that the 




Normative Democratic Peace: Democratic Peace Theory as an Institution 
 
 The research presented here opens up a number of possibilities for future 
researchers, many of which will be discussed below. However, one possible area of 




democratic peace, and the phenomenon is not the direct result of empirical democracy, 
then these research findings will have an impact on the fields of study into monadic 
democratic peace, as well as structural restraint theory. 
 As democracy continues to expand into a universal value, presumably more 
citizens of states that display empirical democratic characteristics, and some that do not, 
will begin to view themselves as members of a democratic one. If this is the case, similar 
events should occur to those that took place over securitization efforts in the United 
States in 1837, France in 1955, and India and Pakistan in 2008. In this way, monadic 
peace could find many more intellectual adherents, as well as the evidence to support the 
findings.  
 Additionally, structural restraints upon democratic war-making could also be 
bolstered by this research. In line with monadic democratic peace theory, the linchpin of 
a structural theory of peace is the idea of audience cost. In short, audience cost theory 
posits that democratic leaders will be unlikely to launch military actions, unless they are 
assured of victory, for fear of electoral reprisal (Fearon, 1994). It was exactly this theory 
that prompted Hayes to do his extensive research on securitization, the process by which 
democratic electorates restrain their leaders from making war even when otherness is 
used by securitizers as validation, and has wide-reaching implications for the theory of a 
structural democratic peace (Hayes, 2012: 70). 
 A case worthy of future research that would bolster both claims is that of United 




ways, this case mirrors those of the case studies under review, with the exception that the 
dyad is not recognized as an enduring rivalry (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Thompson, 2001). 
In both 2001 and 2003, President George W. Bush pushed to securitize Afghanistan and 
Iraq, respectively, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. This 
securitization was successful, as indicated by widespread congressional support and 
Bush’s re-election in 2004. However, upon the election of President Obama in 2008, 
partly on an anti-war platform, the United States has chosen to not seek military action 
against Iran, despite its nuclear ambitions and the objection of realist scholars (Kroenig, 
2012).  
 This case demonstrates the capabilities of democratic perception on explaining a 
monadic, structural democratic peace, although in a more mature form than the cases 
reviewed by this research. While President Bush successfully securitized and took action 
against both Afghanistan and Iraq, two non-empirical democracies, Obama has chosen 
not to seek action against Iran, another exclusion from the empirical democratic club. In a 
recent speech to the United Nations, in which Obama warned against a nuclear Iran, he 
extolled the United States’ roll in the perpetuation of “not just American or Western 
values – but universal values”.
213
 These values included, amongst many others, the 
peaceful resolution of conflict. 
 The outgrowth of this research would be a better understanding of how both 




unto themselves. As both “zones of peace” and “zones of democracy” multiply, it is 
seemingly possible that as more people begin to view themselves as upholders of 
democratic traditions, as well as begin viewing their neighbors of the same, that monadic 
and structural democratic peace can begin to take hold. This phenomenon was discussed 
by both Katzenstein and Neumann in relation to the European core, with significant 
discussion devoted to the Franco-German dyad reviewed here (Katzenstein, 1993; 
Neumann, 1998).  
 Francis Lieber, the first academic American political scientist, described the 
power of institutions thus: “It always forms a prominent element in the idea of an 
institution, whether the term be taken in the strictest sense or not, that it is a group of 
laws, usages and operations standing in close relation to one another, and forming an 
independent whole with a united and distinguishing character of its own” (Onuf, 2002: 
218). The idea of a group of perceived democracies following a basic law of usages and 
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Impact on Other Cases 
 
 Returning to the dyadic model specifically reviewed in this research, four other 
cases with an eclectic geographic spread appear to warrant similar research. I will briefly 
detail those here. 
 First, the Anglo-Argentinian dyad has been an enduring rivalry since 1965 
(Thompson, 2001: 570). In 1982, the two nations went to war over the Falkland Islands. 
At the time, Argentina was not rated a democracy by Polity, but it was democratizing, as 
indicated by its score of 8 in 1983. Since that time, hostilities have continued to erupt 
with no further military action occurring. Most recently, in 2012, a dispute over oil flared 
up between the two states
214
, and efforts at securitization are presently occurring in both 
London and Buenos Aires. The resolution of this latest Anglo-Argentinian conflict could 
provide the most ready case by which to further test the implications of democratic 
perceptions.   
 Second, the Egyptian-Israeli dyad has been an enduring rivalry since the two 
fought a war in 1948 (Thompson, 2001: 571). Since that time, the two states have 
engaged in a host of conflicts surrounding the Sinai Peninsula, ending in the Camp David 
Accords of 1978. While Egypt experienced decades of non-empirical democracy, the 
changes of the Arab Spring would provide a strong test case for democratic perceptions, 
particularly as crisis points continue to open up between the two Middle Eastern states. 
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Third, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, though both democratizing states, 
provide a strong test dyad for future research. The two have been classified as an 
enduring rivalry since the escalated conflict that occurred during the Yugoslav Wars of 
1992 (Thompson, 2001: 570), and any further conflict points could very well depend on 
the perceptions each have of the others democratic sameness. 
Fourth, the Eritrea-Ethiopian dyad could provide the best potential case for future 
research. Ethiopia is marginally an empirical democracy, registering a 1 on the Polity IV 
scale. Eritrea, on the other hand, is disputed largely because elections have been 
hampered by the residual effects of the War of Independence fought between itself and 
Ethiopia a decade ago. Nevertheless, this is listed as having been an enduring rivalry 
since 1998 at the point of Eritrean independence, not dissimilar to the Anglo-American 
dyad of the nineteenth century (Thompson, 2001: 571). In this case of severely contested 
empirical democracy, perceptions thereof could prove important in explaining any future 
conflict points between the two states.  
 
 
Potential for Future Research 
 
 In addition to monadic and structural democratic peace, as well as additional 
dyadic case studies, the research presented here also poses four additional avenues for 
future researchers. First, a great deal could be gained by research into a “longer dash” 




securitization of threat within enduring rivalry dyads proved significant for democratic 
perception theory, even more beneficial would be a process-tracing of the events that 
transpired in between the two conflict points. For example, a detailed look at the 
historical, political, and cultural issues that transpired between the United States and 
Great Britain from 1815-1837, France and Germany from 1925-1955, and India and 
Pakistan from 1999-2008, would allow researchers to identify the normative shifts that 
led to increased positive perceptions of democracy. If one accepts that “actors and 
structures mutually constitute each other” (Hopf, 1998: 181), they would also believe that 
this type of research would bring greater clarity to the mutually constituted processes that 
occurred leading up to a shift in perceptions. This work would build upon the exhaustive 
effort put forth by Kupchan in his explanation of how hostile relationships become more 
productive (Kupchan, 2010). 
 Second, this research also opens the way for leadership and psychological studies 
of perception. If, in fact, perception of democracy is an important causal variable in 
explaining democratic peace, then how that perception is formed becomes paramount. 
One avenue is the process-tracing previously discussed; a second would be the 
psychology of individual leaders. What was it about Van Buren that made him perceive 
Great Britain as a democratic ally while Madison did not? What influenced the 
psychology of a democratic peace activist like Briand while de Gaulle remained largely 
an arch-realist? What psychologically hot-wired Vajpayee and Sharif towards social 




towards inclusiveness? These questions would help ideationally unite the psychological 
and constructivist schools of normative studies (Shannon, 2012). 
 Third, scholars researching conflict theories also could explore a variable that was 
not studied here. A possible explanation for the difference in outcomes within all three 
dyads is that, since both sides recently concluded a conflict with one another, each dyad 
was effectively locked within a continuous tit-for-tat game model whereby each side had 
a telegraphed example of the other’s expected actions (Pruitt and Kim, 2004: 70). If this 
is in fact the case, new process-tracing could re-open the black box to determine how 
learned negotiation set the two sides upon the path towards a de-escalatory spiral, as 
opposed to the escalatory spiral that had characterized their previous dyadic relationship 
(Pruitt and Kim, 2004: 171-188). Exploration of the negotiation variable would be a 
valuable addition to this work. 
 Fourth, the research presented questions the way in which the scholastic 
community chooses to score democracy. The Anglo-American dyad, for example, 
demonstrates the pitfalls of current methods, notably the fact that the United States in 
1812 was scored a 9 on the Polity scale while a slaveholder occupied the White House. 
Significant questions could also be raised about the validity of democratic scoring of 
monarchical Great Britain in 1837, unstable Weimar Germany in 1923, and the fragile 
Pakistani democracy in 2008. In each case, these questions beg for further analysis, but 







 The research presented provides an answer to the research question presented, as 
well as three progressive contributions to democratic peace theory scholarship. When 
posed with the question of what best explains the observation of a democratic peace, 
empirical indicators of democracy or the perception of democracy, detailed case studies 
of the Anglo-American, Franco-German, and Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry dyads yield 
the result that democratic perception is a strong explanatory variable. While empirical 
democracy continues to matter, this research demonstrates that democracy in the 
objective form may be necessary, but certainly not sufficient, in explaining the relative 
peace that has been observed between democratic dyads.  
 Beyond this narrow research question, this thesis also provides three contributions 
that each lead towards future research. First, it offers that how elites and, ultimately, 
members of the electorates that comprise democratic states perceive the democratic 
sameness of a competing dyadic rival has a significant role in the explanatory power 
behind the democratic peace. In this way, it attempts to fill in a gap in the democratic 
peace research, namely that caused by exceptions that have become increasingly vexing 
to what Chan calls “the most robust generalization that has been produced by this 
research tradition” (Chan, 1997: 60).  
 Second, this research provides a positive step towards the integration of normative 




democratic peace. Normative theory, which counts a preponderance of the overall 
theoreticians in this tradition, emphasizes “the role of shared democratic principles, 
perceptions, and expectations of behavior” (O’Neal and Russett, 2001: 53). When 
coupled with Hayes’ securitization theory and Fearon’s audience cost theory, however, 
the structural constraints of a democratic populace become intertwined with the 
normative constraints offered by most prevailing democratic peace theorists. The study of 
democratic perception, particularly amongst citizens of the polis, provides a contribution 
towards integrating these seemingly adverse concepts.  
 Empirical democracy, however, could provide a similar avenue when studied as 
part of the tripartite research traditions of O’Neal and Russett, Hayes and Fearon. 
Democratic perceptions, on the other hand, display a third unique contribution to the 
democratic peace theory literature. Emanuel Adler, in 1997, stated that the “democratic 
peace cries for a constructivist explanation” (Hayes, 2009: 11). This work does not claim 
to do that; however, it does provide a hypothesis for future research that could add to this 
discussion.  
The hypothesis posits that first, citizens within democratic states begin to adopt 
the normative values of democrats, ultimately leading to the domestic perception that 
ones state is a rightful member of the democratic club, and all the values in which that 
entails. Second, international realist norms, such as sovereignty and security, lead the 
elites of the state to seek conflict. Third, whether or not that conflict is securitized, the 




securitizing party, largely because the citizenry has come to accept a higher expected 
utility from peace than war as part of a democratic ethos (Adler, 1998: 165). Fourth, this 
domestic retribution leads to further conflict points being solved peacefully. Fifth, these 
new normative values lead to reciprocation, and norms begin to mutually constitute the 
actors and the structure of the system (Hopf, 1998: 181) – i.e. a democratic peace within 
anarchy. 
Ted Hopf wrote that “If democracies do not fight each other, then it must be 
because of the way they understand each other, the intersubjective accounts of each other, 
and the socio-international practices that accompany these practices” (Hopf, 1998: 192). 
The study of these three enduring rivalry dyads demonstrates that this intersubjective 
understanding is, indeed, at the core of the democratic peace, and further research into the 
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